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MAKING CONSUMER FINANCE WORK
Natasha Sarin*
The ﬁnancial crisis exposed major fault lines in banking and
ﬁnancial markets more broadly. Policymakers responded with farreaching regulation that created a new agency—the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—and changed the structure and function of
these markets.
Consumer advocates cheered reforms as welfare enhancing, while
the ﬁnancial sector declared that consumers would be harmed by
interventions. With a decade of data now available, this Article
examines the successes and failures of the consumer ﬁnance reform
agenda. Speciﬁcally, it marshals data from every zip code and bank in
the United States to test the efficacy of three of the most signiﬁcant
postcrisis reforms: in the debit, credit, and overdraft markets.
The results are surprising. Despite cosmetic similarities, these
reforms had very different outcomes. Two (changes in the credit and
overdraft markets) increase consumer welfare, while the other (in the
debit market) decreases it. These ﬁndings run counter to prior work by
prominent legal scholars and encourage reevaluation of our
(mis)conceptions about the efficacy of regulation.
The evidence leads to several insights for regulatory design. First,
banks regularly levy hidden fees on consumers, obscuring the true cost
of ﬁnancial products. Regulators should restrict such practices. Second,
consumer ﬁnance markets are regressive: Low-income customers often
pay higher prices than their higher-income counterparts. Regulators
should address this inequity. Finally, banks tend to discourage
regulation by promising their costs will be passed through to consumers.
Regulators should not be overly swayed by their dire warnings.
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INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession was the worst economic downturn in the
United States since the Depression. More Americans lost their jobs than
at any time since World War II.1 More than two million businesses closed
their doors because they could not make payroll.2 Nearly eight million
families lost their homes.3 The average American household lost onethird of its net worth.4
Outrage about the Recession stems from the following inequity:
Although bank executives’ risky bets caused the crisis, the lives of many
consumers were ruined by it.5 President Obama acknowledged exactly
this upon taking office in 2009: “For years, too many Wall Street executives made imprudent and dangerous decisions, seeking proﬁts with too
little regard for risk, too little regulatory scrutiny, and too little accountability.”6
While the President could not undo the pain inﬂicted by the
Recession, he promised policymakers would overhaul ﬁnancial markets
to better protect consumers going forward.7 As a result, a new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was tasked with policing consumer
ﬁnance markets. It would focus on preventing families from being
steered into the risky subprime mortgages whose collapse had kickstarted
a global recession. But it would also protect consumers more broadly
from nefarious practices in product markets ranging from payday loans
to consumer checking accounts and credit lending. The hope was for the

1. See Barack Obama, President Elect, Speech on the Economy, N.Y. Times (Jan. 8,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/us/politics/08text-obama.html [https://
perma.cc/ST22-WKA6]; see also Chris Isidore, Job Loss: Worst in 34 Years, CNN Money
(Feb. 6, 2009), https://money.cnn.com/2009/02/06/news/economy/jobs_january/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/CC7Z-V6HM].
2. The Great Recession: Over but Not Gone?, Northwestern Inst. for Policy Research,
https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/about/news/2014/IPR-research-Great-Recessionunemployment-foreclosures-safety-net-fertility-public-opinion.html [https://perma.cc/
ED2T-KFQE] (last visited July 27, 2019).
3. Kari Paul & Jacob Passy, A Decade After the Housing Crisis, Foreclosures Still
Haunt Homeowners, MarketWatch (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story
/a-decade-after-the-housing-crisis-foreclosures-still-haunt-homeowners-2018-09-27
[https://perma.cc/39T6-XGTJ].
4. Colin Schultz, The Average American Household Lost a Third of Its Net Worth
During the Recession, Smithsonian.com (July 29, 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag.
com/smart-news/average-american-household-lost-third-their-net-worth-during-recession180952191/ [https://perma.cc/5778-AQWR].
5. Marilyn Geewax, Unhappy 10th Anniversary, Great Recession. You Still Hurt Us,
NPR (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/14/570556990/unhappy-10thanniversary-great-recession-you-still-hurt-us [https://perma.cc/FJQ9-CK3K].
6. See Obama, supra note 1.
7. Kimberly Amadeo, Obama 2008 Economic Promises and Platform, The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/obama-2008-economic-promises-and-platform-3305774
[https://perma.cc/QA9V-ERTK] (last updated June 25, 2019).
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CFPB to tilt the scales of power away from large, sophisticated ﬁnancial
institutions and in favor of consumers.
However, the institutions affected by the CFPB’s oversight said
changes would end up hurting, rather than helping, consumers. For
example, in May 2010, Senator Dick Durbin cheered the passage of his
namesake legislation, the “Durbin Amendment” (Durbin). Durbin caps
debit interchange fees, which are the fees merchants pay card issuers to
process electronic transactions.8 Senator Durbin proclaimed that “Wall
Street reform is really about two things: holding big banks accountable
for how they operate and empowering consumers to make good ﬁnancial
choices. Passage of this amendment is a win for the public on both
fronts. . . . [S]mall businesses and their customers will be able to keep
more of their own money.”9
However, the large ﬁnancial institutions that lost revenue because of
Durbin warned that consumers would be harmed by its passage: “Who is
going to pay for this? That Customer that gets that debit card for free,”
assured the CEO of TCF, a midsize Minnesota-based bank.10 Bank of America executives called Durbin a “windfall to large merchants” that would
increase consumer costs.11
Similarly, a year before Durbin, Congress passed the Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act (CARD Act), limiting
banks’ ability to levy credit card penalty fees and hike interest rates. Consumer advocates cheered the reform: “Amidst the ﬁnancial turmoil on
Wall Street, today the House took steps to help those on Main Street . . . .
This historic legislation will help working families . . . .”12
Yet the ﬁnancial industry assured legislators this would not be the
case. They argued that the CARD Act would instead increase the cost of
credit for consumers and small businesses: In fact, Jamie Dimon, the

8. Press Release, Dick Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Durbin
Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment (May 13, 2010), https://www.
durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-statement-on-his-debit-card-swipe-feeamendment [https://perma.cc/2RL7-X54F] [hereinafter Durbin, Statement on Swipe Fee
Amendment].
9. Id.
10. Letter from Brian J. Hurd, Exec. Vice President, TCF Nat’l Bank, to Jennifer J.
Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 18, 2011),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/April/20110405/R-1404/R-1404_030411_
68936_437488369604_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HLK-DJ8L].
11. Letter from Karl F. Kaufmann, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am., to Jennifer J.
Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 22, 2011),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/March/20110302/R-1404/R-1404_022211_
67233_584174234336_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H57U-Y7BQ].
12. Connie Prater, House Passes Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Bill,
Creditcards.com (Sept. 23, 2008), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/creditcardholders-bill-rights-house-vote-pass-1282.php [https://perma.cc/ZQV4-E2LP](internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rep. Carolyn Maloney).
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CEO of JPMorgan, warned that, in response, his bank would stop offering credit cards to 15% of its customers.13
And again, when the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve or
Board) proposed changes to the overdraft regime to limit banks’ ability
to levy overdraft fees, industry participants warned of dire consequences.
“If this folly happens, we estimate that we will close 10–15% of our
consumer accounts. Be careful what you wish, we serve these folks well,”
cautioned an executive at Bridge Community Bank.14
Who got the better of these debates? Did these sweeping regulations
ultimately limit abusive bank practices or instead hamper industries and
deprive consumers of beneﬁcial ﬁnancial products or services? A decade
removed from the crisis, the time is ripe to examine the successes—and
failures—of the consumer reform agenda. This Article relies on empirical evidence to evaluate postcrisis consumer ﬁnancial regulation. The
results are surprising and provide guidance to policymakers about how to
design regulation and evaluate its efficacy.
This is a critical undertaking. More than a decade removed from the
crisis, new risks are emerging in consumer ﬁnance markets: More than
50% of mortgages are now originated in the lightly-regulated shadow
banking sector,15 student loan balances have exploded,16 and the subprime auto loan bubble appears on the verge of collapse.17 In their
seminal 2008 work, Professor Oren Bar-Gill and then-Professor Elizabeth
Warren called on policymakers to make credit “safer” by creating a new
federal regulator, now known as the CFPB, with the authority and
incentives to police consumer ﬁnance markets.18 As consumer advocates
13. Eileen AJ Connelly, Mixed Blessing: Credit Card Reform May Shock Some, Seattle
Times (Feb. 22, 2010), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/mixed-blessing-credit-cardreform-may-shock-some/ [https://perma.cc/67C4-N7CU].
14. Memorandum from Robert A. Steen to Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.
(Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2010/March/20100326/R-1343/
R-1343_032510_32327_341354941882_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C97C-6MVG].
15. See Michele Lerner, The Mortgage Market Is Now Dominated by Non-Bank
Lenders, Wash. Post (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/themortgage-market-is-now-dominated-by-nonbank-lenders/2017/02/22/9c6bf5fc-d1f5-11e6a783-cd3fa950f2fd_story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
16. See Annie Nova, For Some Students, What They Borrow Can End Up Being a
Fraction of What They Wind Up Owing, CNBC (June 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/06/07/peoples-student-loan-balances-are-spiraling-out-of-control.html [https://perma.cc/
7529-HLPN].
17. See Cecile Gutscher, Subprime Auto Debt Is Booming Even as Defaults Soar,
Bloomberg (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/nevermind-defaults-debt-backed-by-subprime-auto-loans-is-hot (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
18. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
98–101 (2008) (“The failure of current attempts at regulation of credit-product safety
prompts us to propose the creation of a new federal regulator—a Financial Product Safety
Commission or a new consumer credit division within an existing agency (the [Federal
Reserve Board] or [Federal Trade Commission]).”).
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wield this authority, the success of the reform agenda relies on heeding
the lessons learned from the triumphs and failures of past regulatory
interventions. Only then can we successfully course correct, where
necessary, to best serve consumer interests.
This Article begins by analyzing three of the most important
postcrisis consumer reforms: the Durbin Amendment affecting the debit
market; the CARD Act concerning the credit market; and varied reforms
to the overdraft market. It draws insights from big data, relying on a
unique dataset of effective interchange rates for 120 industries in 40,000
zip codes in the United States (totaling more than 10 million observations); branch-level data on checking account fees reported weekly for
58,000 bank branches in the United States; and ﬁnancial regulatory data
reported quarterly by each of the 4,800 bank holding companies in the
United States. This Article demonstrates that these three regulations
have varied efficacy—two (overdraft reform and the CARD Act) beneﬁt
consumers, while one (the Durbin Amendment) exacerbates the market
failures it should have corrected. It is surprising that similarly situated
interventions have different impacts, and these ﬁndings refute prominent prior scholarship.
This Article then uses the empirical evidence to glean lessons for
regulatory design. Unlike much of the literature, this Article does not
assess a single intervention.19 Instead, it tests the efficacy of the broader
consumer reform project by comparing the design and effectiveness of
interventions in distinct markets. Based on this analysis, the Article offers
explicit guidance for both how to regulate and how to analyze the incidence of regulation. These suggestions are threefold. First, regulators
should target salience problems: Many consumers are incognizant of or
ignore hidden prices—like the cost of overdrafting or late fees—and so
end up paying more than they expect for ﬁnancial products.20 This is a
market failure that well-designed regulation can solve. Second, regulators
should heed the fact that our ﬁnancial markets are regressive. As this
19. For analysis of the CARD Act, see generally Sumit Agarwal, Souphala
Chomsisengphet, Neale Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, Regulating Consumer Financial
Products: Evidence from Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. Econ. 111 (2014) [hereinafter Agarwal et
al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products]; Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card
Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 967 (2012); Vikram Jambulapati &
Joanna Stavins, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: What Did Banks Do?, 46 J. Banking & Fin.
21 (2014); Scott T. Nelson, Private Information and Price Regulation in the US Credit
Card Market (July 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://economics.mit.edu/ﬁles/
14225 [https://perma.cc/E7ER-HJP5] [hereinafter Nelson, Private Information]. For
analysis of the Durbin Amendment, see generally Benjamin S. Kay, Mark D. Manuszak &
Cindy M. Vojtech, Competition and Complementarities in Retail Banking: Evidence from
Debit Card Interchange Regulation, 34 J. Fin. Intermediation 91 (2018); Vladimir
Mukharlyamov & Natasha Sarin, The Impact of the Durbin Amendment on Banks,
Merchants, and Consumers (Jan. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3048&context=faculty_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/6QUN-Y9BR].
20. See infra section II.B.
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Article illustrates, low-income consumers tend to pay higher prices than
their higher-income counterparts.21 This is because wealthier consumers
tend to be more sophisticated and have more access to the most
attractive ﬁnancial products. 22 Well-designed regulation can decrease
unfair cross-subsidization, though poorly designed regulation can exacerbate it. Finally, when analyzing regulation, policymakers and academics
should focus on what banks do—not what they say. Financial institutions
have every incentive to dissuade regulators by stating that consumers will
be harmed, not helped, by intervention.23 They repeat this dire warning
each time lawmakers act, and as a result, many policymakers and academics believe regulation is futile.24 The data show that regulation can work
and that relying too much on banks’ cautions will lead to mistaken
pessimism about the regulatory project.25
Part I of this Article begins with analysis of the Durbin Amendment,
which capped debit interchange fees. Prior to Durbin, a merchant would
typically pay around 2% of the value of a customer’s debit transaction to
their bank to cover the cost of processing that transaction.26 Post-Durbin,
these fees are capped at $0.22.27 Thus, pre-Durbin, a merchant paid $2 to
process a $100 transaction, and post-Durbin, they pay only $0.22, about
one-tenth of the previous fee. As a result, banks lost—and merchants
saved—$6.5 billion annually.28 The policy objective was for these merchant savings to pass through to consumers in the form of lower retail
prices.29 However, this Article is the ﬁrst to show empirically that consumers were harmed, not helped, by the passage of this legislation. Banks
respond to Durbin by increasing consumer account fees to recover a
signiﬁcant share of lost interchange revenue. And merchants in large
part eat the gains from Durbin, failing to fully pass through cost savings
21. See infra section II.B.
22. See infra section II.B.
23. See infra section II.C.
24. See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Applications of Economics to an Imperfect World, 69
Am. Econ. Rev., May 1979, at 1, 11 (“The regulatory rule is: each time the dike springs a
leak, plug it with one of your ﬁngers; just as dynamic industry will perpetually ﬁnd ways of
opening new holes in the dike, so an ingenious regulator will never run out of ﬁngers.”).
25. See infra sections II.C.1–.2.
26. See, e.g., Durbin, Statement on Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 8 (noting that
at the time of the amendment’s passage, Visa and MasterCard charged interchange fees of
around 1–2% of the transaction amount).
27. See 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2019). To be precise, the fee consists of a $0.21 cap plus
5 basis points times the value of the transaction, with a $0.01 adjustment allowed to cover
the implementation of antifraud measures. In practice, nearly all transactions are charged
$0.22. See The Durbin Amendment, Advocharge, https://advocharge.com/the-durbinamendment/ [https://perma.cc/AND3-5P85] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019) (“Essentially, the
ﬁnal cost is 5 basis points and $.22 for normal debit card transactions.”).
28. See infra section I.A.3.
29. Margarette Burnette, The Durbin Amendment Explained, Nerdwallet,
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/durbin-amendment-explained/ [https://
perma.cc/G4TB-QJ3Z] (last updated Aug. 30, 2017).
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to customers.30 In fact, Durbin is regressive, because only low-income
consumers bear new bank fees. Additionally, because Durbin caps
debit—but not credit—interchange, banks evade its impact by encouraging greater use of unregulated credit cards, which traps consumers in
expensive cycles of debt.31
The Article next considers the CARD Act, which, like Durbin, sought
to decrease consumer costs. Prior to the CARD Act, banks increased
credit card interest rates without warning and levied exorbitant penalty
fees. As a result, credit was signiﬁcantly more expensive—particularly for
low-income consumers who are most often hit by penalty fees—than consumers anticipated. The CARD Act restricted how issuers price credit—
for example, by requiring notice before increasing interest rates and by
capping late fees.32 Unlike Durbin, the CARD Act achieved its intended
effect: Consumers save around $12 billion annually.33 There is no evidence that issuers changed other aspects of credit card prices left
unregulated by the CARD Act to compensate for losses in interest and
penalty fee revenue.34
Finally, this Article analyzes changes to the overdraft regime. In the
decade preceding the ﬁnancial crisis, overdraft fees became one of the
fastest-growing sources of bank revenue. Consumers could effectively pay
$40 for their morning coffee (thanks to a $35 overdraft fee) by using
their debit cards without sufficient funds in their checking accounts.
Postcrisis, regulators required that banks affirmatively opt in consumers
to overdraft protection before levying overdraft fees. If a consumer is not
opted in and tries to use a debit card to make a purchase, their bank will
decline the transaction. As a result of this new default rule, the share of
consumer accounts eligible for overdraft protection decreased by 84%.35
Empirical analysis disproves the popular consensus among legal academics that the overdraft default rule fails to achieve its ends. Speciﬁcally, this
Article shows that due to this intervention, banks lost 15% of their

30. The evidence on merchant response to Durbin is based on the gas station
industry. The gas station industry is an ideal market to examine because pricing in the
industry is local and involves only a few products. It is, of course, possible that this
adjustment does not reﬂect price movements in other industries for which we lack data.
31. See infra section I.A.4.
32. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No.
111-24, § 101, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735–36 (2009).
33. See infra section I.B.3.
34. See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 19, at 999 (“[T]hrough our data, we saw
signiﬁcant reductions in two types of fees directly regulated by the CARD Act that provide
a substantial source of revenue for credit card issuers . . . but no substantial increases in
other credit card rates and fees to compensate for the consequent loss in fee revenue.”).
35. CFPB, CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs 29 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N4B-EXW2]
[hereinafter CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs] (ﬁnding that only 16.1% of accounts in a
2012 CFPB study affirmatively opted in for overdraft coverage).
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precrisis overdraft revenue, and there is no evidence that banks offset
these losses.36
At ﬁrst glance, these three interventions appear similar. They involve
the same ﬁnancial institutions, and each is a price regulation that decreases banks’ fee revenue. In each intervention, regulators and academics voiced concerns about the possibility of regulatory “whack-a-mole”37—
that is, in response to well-intentioned interventions that reduce revenue,
banks would adjust other rates and fees.38 However, the data reveal that
banks offset losses only from the interchange fee cap—not from decreases in credit card and overdraft revenue. Why?
One answer is salience. Many consumers are prone to welldocumented behavioral limitations.39 One such limitation is the tendency
to focus on prominent (“salient”) aspects of a price bundle—for example the cost of an airline ticket in bold, large letters on Expedia—but
ignore aspects that are less clearly displayed (for example, the cost of
checking a bag or changing that reservation). Firms have no incentive to
compete to offer low nonsalient prices because most consumers ignore
them. In fact, ﬁrms purposely charge high nonsalient prices, so they can
offer low salient prices and attract the most customers. Consumer ﬁnancial contracts have become increasingly complicated over time—the
average credit card contract used to be one page long but now averages
more than thirty pages.40 Sophisticated banks charge low or no salient
prices such as a 0% annual percentage rate (APR) or a checking account
with a $0 monthly fee. They tuck away high nonsalient fees deep in
contracts that no one, not even the most sophisticated law professor
among us, would ever read. The data reveal that when regulators restrict
nonsalient fees—as did the CARD Act and overdraft reform—banks are
unlikely to pass the costs of these interventions through to consumers.
As such, Part II of this Article begins with the ﬁrst lesson for
regulators: Policymakers should regulate nonsalient prices. The CARD
Act and overdraft reform did just this: They can be understood as re36. See infra section II.A.
37. “Whack-a-mole” is an arcade game. Players use a mallet to hit moles back into
their holes. When one mole disappears, another rises. The objective is to hit as many
moles as possible in a certain period of time. Whack-a-Mole, Lexico, https://www.lexico.com
/en/deﬁnition/whack-a-mole [https://perma.cc/V5FP-KZJH] (last visited July 25, 2019).
38. See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shaﬁr, The Case for
Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in New Perspectives on Regulation 25, 50 (David Moss
& John Cisternino eds., 2009) (voicing concern that regulation that reduces revenue from
penalty fees would mean that other rates and fees would be adjusted to compensate, and
there is little reason to believe that the adjustments would be in consumers’ favor).
39. Behavioral economists focus on theoretically and empirically demonstrating
human deviations from rational behavior. Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky pioneered early work in this ﬁeld. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251–78 (1986)
(discussing how the modern theory of decisionmaking is at risk).
40. Benjamin Sarlin, Elizabeth Warren Talks Bank Reform, Daily Beast (Apr. 21,
2010), https://www.thedailybeast.com/elizabeth-warren-talks-bank-reform [https://perma.cc/
TU27-4HAB].
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stricting banks’ ability to hide fees on page twenty-six of that thirty-page
contract. In light of these restrictions, banks faced a choice. To offset
these losses, they would have had to raise salient prices (for instance,
increase the introductory APR on page one of the credit card contract)
and risk losing market share by increasing a price consumers pay attention to. JPMorgan is the largest lender in the country, and its credit card
business contributes to its nearly $100 billion41 in revenue—why risk
alienating its customer base over relatively minor ($750 million42) CARD
Act losses? JPMorgan—and other large ﬁnancial institutions—did not adjust salient prices in response to regulation of nonsalient prices. The
result is an increase in overall consumer welfare.
This Article also proposes a novel alternative to direct regulation of
nonsalient prices: a “salience shock.” The approach is simple—many
consumers ignore penalty fees because they are inattentive (for example,
they do not realize they are about to overdraft) or overly optimistic (for
instance, they do not believe they will ever be delinquent in repaying
their credit card balances).43 A timely “shock” that focuses their attention, like a notiﬁcation immediately before overdrafting, will decrease
the incidence of costly consumer mistakes. A recent reform in the United
Kingdom provides evidence to support this view: Banks that give customers text-message alerts about low account balances ﬁnd overdraft incidence declines by around 25%.44
As each of the postcrisis interventions studied illustrates, consumer
ﬁnance markets regularly feature cross-subsidies running from low-income consumers to their wealthy counterparts. The second lesson of this
Article is that well-designed regulation should address these crosssubsidies.
This is true in markets where salience problems exist. Hidden fees
are most often borne by low-income consumers: Nine percent of bank
customers—disproportionately low income and less educated—are
responsible for 84% of banks’ overdraft income.45 Additionally, lowerincome customers are less likely to pay their credit card bills on time,46
41. $750 million is approximately 3% of JP Morgan’s 2017 net revenue
(approximately $25 billion after accounting for expenses)—certainly not insigniﬁcant, but
not a large contributor. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report 2017, at 3,
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/annualreport2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H7A-JTHF].
42. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, JP Morgan’s Dimon Says New Laws Have Hurt His
Company, Wash. Post (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2010/04/01/AR2010040103684.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
43. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
44. Press Release, Competition & Mkts. Auth., New Overdraft Alerts as CMA Banking
Rules Come into Force (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/newoverdraft-alerts-as-cma-banking-rules-come-into-force [https://perma.cc/RUX2-X4BZ].
45. See CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 18.
46. Gerri Detweiler, How Rich People Use Credit Cards Differently from the Rest of
Us, Credit.com (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-rich-people-usecredit-cards-differently-than-the-rest-of-us-2015-2 [https://perma.cc/HA8Y-5555].
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and the high fees they pay subsidize cheaper credit for the rest of the
population.
But cross-subsidization also exists in ﬁnancial markets without salience problems, because wealthier customers have access to more
attractive products. Consumers all pay the same price for retail goods,
even though some transact with cash (no processing fee for merchants)
and others use rewards cards (3% to 5% processing fee for merchants).
Financial ﬁrms beneﬁt from high card processing fees, but so do
consumers who transact with these cards: A wealthy customer who uses a
platinum American Express to buy a new pair of $100 sneakers gets
airline miles and cash back.47 If the value of those rewards totals $2 (such
as a 2% cash back), they effectively pay only $98 for new shoes. A customer who uses cash pays the full $100. This may seem miniscule, but it
scales quickly: On average, card-using households receive nearly $1,200
from cash users each year.48 This is a regressive transfer: Your airline
miles are subsidized by low-income consumers who do not have access to
credit.
The existence of these cross-subsidies justiﬁes regulatory
intervention. The CFPB has broad power to prohibit abusive or unfair
bank practices that the consumer cannot reasonably avoid.49 The payments market is a prime candidate for CFPB intervention, because one
group of consumers (low income) pays higher prices and cannot
reasonably avoid these higher prices without access to rewards cards.
Curbing banks’ loyalty rewards programs will decrease these crosssubsidies. A less radical alternative is to allow merchants to price discriminate—for example, by charging higher prices to the wealthy, who pay
with rewards cards with high processing fees; or at the very least, by
allowing merchants to nudge consumers toward using payment instruments with lower processing fees.50
Importantly, when policymakers debate regulation they often ask
whether it will increase overall consumer welfare. This focus is misplaced.
Removing cross-subsidies in consumer ﬁnance markets may not help all
consumers, because the wealthy beneﬁt from the status quo. However,

47. See infra section II.B.
48. Scott Schuh, Oz Shy & Joanna Stavins, Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit
Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Pub. Pol’y
Discussion Papers No. 10-03, 2010).
49. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (2012) (“The Bureau is authorized to exercise its
authorities under Federal consumer ﬁnancial law for the purposes of ensuring that, with
respect to consumer ﬁnancial products and services . . . consumers are protected from
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination . . . .”).
50. See generally Natasha Sarin, What’s in Your Wallet (and What Should the Law Do
About It?), 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(arguing that given recent judicial barriers to merchant price discrimination, it is
appropriate for the CFPB to use its authority to curtail “unfair, abusive, and deceptive
practices” to facilitate merchants’ encouraging consumers to use payment instruments
with lower interchange fees).

1530

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:1519

regulation that creates a more equitable ﬁnancial system and increases
the welfare of the most ﬁnancially fragile is desirable.51
Finally, the empirical analysis demonstrates that policymakers and
academics should heed what banks do in response to regulation, not
what they say they will do. Every time regulators act, affected institutions
claim that the result will be harm, not beneﬁt, for consumers. These
warnings lead consumer advocates to be skeptical of the desirability of
what we now know are welfare-enhancing reforms, like restricting credit
card late fees.52 They also lead academics to proclaim that “light-touch”
regulatory approaches are futile, because sophisticated institutions will
always pass along the costs of regulation to consumers. 53 Instead of
interventions that restrict markets but allow consumers to freely choose
between diverse products, these critics advocate for more heavy-handed
approaches, like mandates banning certain ﬁnancial products.54
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom about the inevitable
failure of light-touch regulation. Prominent legal scholarship by Professor Lauren Willis and Professors Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes question
the effectiveness of behavioral policies, like the new opt-in default rule
for overdraft protection. They suggest that since ﬁrms rationally optimize
and consumers do not, light-touch regulation will not be effective,
because ﬁrms will rationally offset it and default consumers into the
choice that is most proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. In the case of overdraft, this
means that ﬁrms will work to opt-in consumers.55
There are theoretical reasons to believe that ﬁrms will offset
regulation in the manner these authors describe.56 Firms themselves say

51. See infra section II.B.2.
52. See Barr et al., supra note 38, at 50.
53. See generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims
Its Sails and Why, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1593 (2013). This Article adopts the term “light-touch”
from Professors Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes to refer to regulatory approaches that
preserve a role for consumer choice. To understand the difference between “light-touch”
and more heavy-handed regulatory approaches, consider the difference between the new
overdraft opt-in rules (which change the default but leave the market unchanged for
consumers who like overdraft as a product), see JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 41,
and the Bubb and Pildes proposal to ban overdraft as a product (which would overhaul
the overdraft market, even for consumers who would prefer it unchanged), see Bubb &
Pildes, supra, at 1657–58. While the new opt-in rules are an example of a light-touch
regulation, both the CARD Act and Durbin are more heavy handed.
54. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1658 (“Policy can offer more . . . than just
disclosure and defaults, and the unwillingness to seriously analyze regulatory tools that go
beyond nudges limits the role BLE [behavioral law and economics] should be playing in
fashioning welfare-improving interventions. To illustrate, we consider two policy tools . . . :
regulating products and reshaping ﬁrm incentives.”).
55. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1657. See generally Lauren E. Willis, When
Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1155 (2013).
56. See Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale Mahoney & Johannes
Stroebel, A Simple Framework for Estimating Consumer Beneﬁts from Regulating Hidden
Fees, J.L. & Econ. 5239, 5244–50 (2014) (providing a simple theoretical model that
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they will offset regulation. However, the magnitude of this offset—and
thus the efficacy of intervention—is ultimately an empirical question and
one this Article undertakes with surprising results. Speciﬁcally, the data
reveal that the new overdraft default rules are a resounding success, not a
failure as previously believed. Despite assumptions about how banks will
respond—based not unreasonably on how they say they will respond—
most ﬁnancial institutions do not aggressively opt-in consumers but
rather move away from overdraft as a product.57
The implications are signiﬁcant. Past authors cite the new overdraft
default rules as a canonical example of how behavioral law and
economics approaches do not deliver for consumers.58 However, the new
opt-in regime does achieve its ends and does help consumers. This case is a
paradigmatic example of how behavioral policies work, not an illustration of their limitations. Fortunately the existence of a power imbalance
in the consumer–bank relationship does not doom all efforts at taming
these markets. The aggressiveness with which ﬁnancial institutions respond to regulation varies depending on market particulars, and only by
following the data can we glean accurate insights about regulation.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I describes
three of the most important postcrisis consumer ﬁnancial reforms—in
the debit, credit, and overdraft markets—detailing the rationale for
regulatory intervention and using hand-collected data to present novel
empirical evidence on the impact of these reforms. Armed with this
evidence, Part II then elaborates on several lessons for policymakers.
I. POSTCRISIS INTERVENTIONS
In the wake of the Recession, the ﬁnancial sector underwent
signiﬁcant regulatory changes, many of which sought to tame consumer
ﬁnance markets. Three of these changes—implemented through Durbin,
the CARD Act, and amendments to Regulation E that changed the
overdraft default rules—were price regulations aimed at decreasing
banks’ fee revenue and increasing consumer savings. This Part considers
the efficacy of each intervention with novel empirical analysis using data
from every bank and every zip code in the United States.
A.

The Durbin Amendment

1. The Policy Problem. — The payment card system is a two-sided
market, with cards demanded both by cardholders who use them as a
means of purchase and merchants who accept them as payment for

illustrates that in a perfectly competitive market, banks will fully offset regulatory
interventions like the CARD Act).
57. See infra section I.C.3.
58. See Willis, supra note 55, at 1181–85.
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goods. 59 An interchange fee results from a complex series of
transactions,60 but it can be thought of as simply the processing fee a
customer’s bank collects from a merchant following a card transaction.61
The two-sided nature of these markets means card networks must
choose prices that encourage adoption by both sides of the market—
cards that merchants do not accept will not generate interchange
revenue and neither will cards that merchants accept but consumers do
not use. 62 This two-sidedness, at least conceptually, discourages card
networks from charging interchange fees that are too high; interchange
fees above competitive levels will discourage merchants from accepting
expensive cards and encourage the entry of lower-cost competitors.63
Even so, historically, interchange rates have been challenged on
antitrust grounds, with the earliest example being National Bancard Corp.
(NaBanco) v. Visa USA, Inc.64 This case involved a dispute between Visa
and NaBanco, a third-party processor of merchant card transactions, over
the legality of interchange fees.65 NaBanco’s business model relied on it
competing with Visa member banks to process electronic transactions for
merchants.66 NaBanco struggled to compete with Visa member banks
that could afford to offer lower rates to merchants because Visa gave “onus” transactions (where customers and merchants banked with the same
institution) a discount.67 This case established the legality of interchange
fees. The court concluded that this fee arrangement was “pro-competitive” and no less-restrictive alternative existed to allow for the
distribution of costs associated with payment transactions.68
Importantly, as discussed below, these fees were always salient to the
merchants that bear them. As a result, NaBanco was followed by a near-

59. Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy & Lacey L. Plache,
Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card
Interchange Fees, 73 Antitrust L.J. 571, 571 (2006).
60. See Barbara Pacheco & Richard Sullivan, Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit
Card Markets: What Role for Public Authorities? A Summary of a Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City Conference, 2006 Econ. Rev. 87, 92–93 (providing an introduction to the
mechanics of interchange fees).
61. Id. at 92. In general, this processing fee varies depending on the card used:
“[C]redit cards carry the highest interchange fee, PIN debit the lowest, with signature
debit in between.” Id. at 93.
62. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, An Economic Analysis of the Determination
of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems, 2 Rev. Network Econ. 69, 72 (2003),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f850/0560f04ad3a1d0abba4db4932f71ba3fa1c6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AUZ4-LN5T].
63. Id.
64. 596 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) (ﬁnding
interchange fee arrangements more procompetitive than anticompetitive).
65. Id. at 1239.
66. Id. at 1240.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1265.
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constant stream of antitrust litigation 69 by merchants upset at high
interchange costs and alleging price-ﬁxing by Visa and Mastercard, which
together controlled 71% of the payment card market in 2008.70 Merchants have successfully challenged various card-network practices as
anticompetitive. For example, exclusivity agreements (forbidding banks
from issuing cards from other networks if they issue cards from Visa or
MasterCard) and “Honor-All-Cards” terms (contractual provisions that
require that merchants who accept basic cards also accept high-price
rewards cards issued by the same network) were deemed unlawful.71
These changes decreased market frictions and encouraged the emergence of new competitors like American Express and Discover.
Despite increased competitive pressure, in the decade leading up to
the crisis, card networks’ revenue from interchange expense increased
rather than decreased, due to the growth in electronic payments and the
introduction of rewards cards with high processing fees.72 As a result,
interchange expense became even more signiﬁcant for merchants, often
their second-highest cost of operating after labor. 73 Exploding interchange expense prompted calls for regulatory intervention.74
2. Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. — Section 1075 of the
Dodd–Frank Act75 was introduced by Senator Durbin and is colloquially
known as the “Durbin Amendment.” In its ﬁnal form, it required the
Federal Reserve to establish rules ensuring “reasonable and
proportional” debit interchange fees that would decrease merchant costs
69. See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Appellants sued appellees under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, for antitrust violations, alleging appellees
conspired with each other to set the fees charged to merchants, such as appellants, for
payment of credit card sales.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 101
(2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that merchants sought damages for alleged violations of the
Sherman Act that resulted in plaintiffs incurring “supra-competitive ‘interchange fees’” for
debit and credit transactions from 1992 to 2003); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344
F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The complaint charged that MasterCard and Visa U.S.A.,
which are organized as joint ventures owned by their member banking institutions,
conspired to restrain trade . . . .”); see also Retailers Sue Visa over Fees, L.A. Times (July
16, 2005), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-jul-16-fi-visa16-story.html
[https://perma.cc/U7LL-AXCF]. For a full description of legal challenges to interchange
fees, see U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-45, Rising Interchange Fees Have
Increased Costs for Merchants, but Options for Reducing Fees Pose Challenges 40–42
(2009).
70. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 69, at 19.
71. See Wal-Mart, 396 F.3d at 101, 103 (affirming a settlement that required the
cessation of Visa and Mastercard’s “Honor-All-Cards” policy); United States v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 344 F.3d at 24 (ﬁnding exclusivity agreements unlawful).
72. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 69, at 23.
73. Paul Gackle, The Fight over Interchange Fees, Frontline (Nov. 24, 2009), https://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/themes/interchange.html [https://perma.cc
/KQJ8-ESGJ].
74. Pacheco & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 91.
75. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010) (codiﬁed at 15 U.S.C. §1693o-2 (2012)).
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and result in lower consumer prices.76 The amendment preserved an exception for small issuers (with less than $10 billion in assets).77 Because
of its late introduction to Dodd–Frank in May 2010, Durbin was passed
without hearings or debate, and many took issue with the speed of its passage.78 Critics also pointed to the difficulties of prior interchange caps;
for example, those implemented in Australia resulted in bank fee increases to recover lost revenue.79
In December 2010, the Federal Reserve proposed a rule
implementing Durbin: a $0.12 cap per debit transaction.80 The ﬁnancial
services industry was outraged; in fact, one bank even challenged the
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(1)–(2). For this work, I focus on Durbin’s interchange
cap. Further work remains to be done on the consequences of other aspects of the
amendment, for example, the exclusivity and routing restrictions, which halved the
volume for Visa’s pin-debit payment processer, Interlink, causing Visa to levy a network fee
to encourage routing through Interlink. See Interlink Loses More than Half Its Volume as
Durbin Routing Provisions Take Effect, Dig. Transactions (July 25, 2012), https://
www.digitaltransactions.net/interlink-loses-more-than-half-its-volume-as-durbin-routingprovisions-take-effect [https://perma.cc/PL9J-MY8W]; Ursula Librizzi, Visa Increasing
Fixed Acquirer Network Fee (FANF) Rates, PayJunction Blog (Dec. 21, 2017), https://
blog.payjunction.com/visa-ﬁxed-acquirer-network-fee [https://perma.cc/W587-NRMH].
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6).
78. The President of the American Bankers Association called the Durbin
Amendment “11th hour” legislation that “hand[ed] one industry a victory without
considering the unintended consequences of the government second-guessing the
market.” Rob Nichols, Opinion, The Durbin Amendment: A Costly Price Control
Experiment, Hill (June 27, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economybudget/284842-the-durbin-amendment-a-costly-price-control-experiment [https://perma.cc
/HPN8-W68S]. An opinion piece even attacked Senator Durbin for his championing of
interchange legislation, noting that one of the largest beneﬁciaries, Wal-Mart, announced
its intention to open stores in the Chicago area (which Senator Durbin represents) and
donated $20 million to Illinois charities on the eve of a key vote on the measure. See
Stephen Moore, Opinion, Everyday Low Politics, Wall St. J., https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748703571704575340951256767996 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (last updated July 2, 2010); see also Mike Mercer, Opinion, Senators Must Hear
from Consumers, Savannah Morning News (June 6, 2010), https://www.savannahnow.com
/column/2011-06-06/mercer-senators-must-hear-consumers [https://perma.cc/JY95-Q8A9]
(supporting legislation that would delay the implementation of the Durbin Amendment to
allow for public hearings).
79. See, e.g., Howard Chang, David S. Evans & Daniel D. Garcia Swartz, The Effect of
Regulatory Intervention in Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of Interchange-Fee
Capping in Australia, 4 Rev. Network Econ. 328, 337–41 (2005) (noting that banks
increased card fees to recover lost interchange fee revenues). Note though that this
assessment of the Australian experience is not shared by all observers. See Joseph Farrell,
Assessing Australia Interchange Regulation: Comments on Chang, Evans and Garcia
Swartz, 4 Rev. Network Econ. 1, 1–5 (2005) (arguing that Chang et al., supra, suffers from
limited and noisy data and that the “correct reading” is “so far, the data doesn’t show
much”).
80. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
Requests Comment on a Proposed Rule to Establish Debit Card Interchange Fee
Standards and Prohibit Network Exclusivity Arrangements and Routing Restrictions (Dec.
16, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20101216a.htm
[https://perma.cc/LRX8-A2U3].
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constitutionality of Durbin, arguing that the regulation forced banks to
offer debit services at a price below cost.81 Regulators voiced concern as
well, suggesting that the small-issuer exemption would fail in practice because networks would decrease interchange rates for large and small
issuers alike rather than vary rates by issuer size.82
The Federal Reserve’s ﬁnal rule raised the debit interchange cap to
$0.22 plus ﬁve basis points times the total value of the transaction. Importantly, credit card interchange fees were left unregulated. This ﬁnal
rule prompted yet another constitutional challenge, this time by a coalition of merchants angered by the Board’s decision to raise the fee cap
from its initial proposal.83 The Supreme Court declined to hear the case,
and the cap remains.84
3. Impact of Regulatory Intervention. — Considering the effect of
Durbin on banks and merchants can help us understand its impact on
overall consumer welfare and help inform regulation of this market and
of two-sided platforms more generally.
To study how banks responded to Durbin, I rely on data from a
variety of sources.85 Speciﬁcally, I look to bank ﬁnancial statements to see
how bank revenue changes following Durbin’s enactment (Figure 1). I
then use data from RateWatch, which surveys bank branches weekly on
their fee-setting practices. These data allow us to examine how bank
checking account prices change in response to Durbin (Figures 2 and 3).
I next use daily gas station prices to see how merchants responded to
81. TCF lost in district court in South Dakota and lost its appeal in the Eighth
Circuit. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45059 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2011).
82. Both Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Sheila Bair,
former Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), voiced these
concerns. See Evan Weinberger, Bernanke Questions Small Bank Swipe Fee Exemption,
Law360 (Feb. 17, 2011), https://www.law360.com/articles/225275/bernanke-questionssmall-bank-swipe-fee-exemption (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also Elec.
Payments Coal., On the Eve of Implementation, Fed Chairman Bernanke and FDIC
Chairman Bair Still “Concerned” that Debit Card Rule Exemption for Small Financial
Institutions Won’t Work, PR Newswire (May 12, 2011), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/on-the-eve-of-implementation-fed-chairman-bernanke-and-fdic-chairman-bair-stillconcerned-that-debit-card-rule-exemption-for-small-financial-institutions-wont-work121734093.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). In response, an amendment was
offered to delay the implementation of Durbin until an FDIC study ascertaining its impact
on community banks was completed. This bill failed by only six votes. Alexander Bolton,
Senate Rejects Delay of Debit-Fee Regulations, Ending K Street Battle (June 9, 2011),
https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/165411-senate-rejects-delay-of-debit-cardregulations-ending-biggest-k-street-battle-of-2011 [https://perma.cc/3VYM-2KWX].
83. NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1170 (2015).
84. Id.
85. The primary empirical results on the Durbin Amendment were developed in
joint work with Vladimir Mukharlyamov. See Vladimir Mukharlyamov & Natasha Sarin,
Price Regulation in Two-Sided Markets: Empirical Evidence from Debit Cards (July 2019)
(unpublished working paper) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation].
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Durbin (Figure 4). I am also able to observe how credit and debit usage
changes in response to Durbin with data from the annual Nielsen Report
(Figure 5).
a. Bank impact. — Interchange income dropped instantaneously after
Durbin. As Figure 1 shows, the decrease is concentrated in banks above
the $10 billion threshold, suggesting that large issuers bore the brunt of
Durbin, as intended. Losses for banks above the Durbin threshold total
approximately $6.5 billion per year, a 25% decrease in interchange
revenue.86
FIGURE 1: INTERCHANGE FEES87
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Decreasing banks’ interchange revenue was, of course, Durbin’s
purpose. However, banks warned that they would be forced to recover
lost revenue by increasing other consumer fees.88 Not surprisingly, many
large banks (Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Suntrust, and Regions
Financial) initially proposed a fee on debit purchases to recoup Durbin
losses: $5 every month consumers used their debit cards as a means of
purchase. This fee was abandoned due to consumer outrage. A bank con86. This estimate understates bank losses because banks report interchange revenue
only if it constitutes more than 3% of noninterest income. Ten percent of banks above the
Durbin threshold that reported interchange income in Q3 2011 no longer reported it in
Q4 2011. See id. at 11–13.
87. This chart was prepared to illustrate pre- and post-Durbin trends in interchange
fees for the banks above the $10 billion asset threshold relative to banks below the
threshold. The dataset relied on is the bank regulatory “Call Reports” that are ﬁled
quarterly by ﬁnancial institutions. See id. (explaining the dataset in question).
88. Comments to the Federal Reserve’s proposed rulemaking contain several such
cautions by banks. See, e.g., Kaufmann, supra note 11; see also Hurd, supra note 10.
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sultant suggested that the result would be a less conspicuous increase in
fees: Banks “are going to have to hide the fees and the customers will still
have to pay for them.”89
In practice, this is exactly what happened. Figures 2 and 3 below
show the impact of Durbin on free checking and monthly fees associated
with bank checking accounts. Post-Durbin, the availability of free checking accounts decreased by more than 40 percentage points for covered
issuers: Said another way, in the pre-Durbin period, nearly 60% of large
banks offered free checking; post-Durbin, this share fell to below 20%. In
contrast, checking account fees more than doubled, from less than $4 to
more than $7, for Durbin banks. Signiﬁcantly, these increases are not related to general trends in banking—there is neither an equivalent decrease in free checking nor an increase in maintenance fees for banks
below the Durbin threshold. In fact, banks recovered much of their lost
interchange revenue by increasing consumer fees.90
The increase in fees is borne primarily by low-income customers
because monthly maintenance fees are waived for customers above a certain minimum threshold in their checking accounts.91 One unintended
consequence of Durbin is that higher fees priced some consumers out of
the market and resulted in their using more expensive banking replacements such as check-cashing and payday-lending facilities.92 In the most
89. Tara Siegel Bernard, In Retreat, Bank of America Cancels Debit Card Fees, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/business/bank-of-americadrops-plan-for-debit-card-fee.html [https://perma.cc/NWP5-MY54].
90. See Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 24, 36 (“Overall,
banks recover around 40% of their losses from Durbin through higher account fees.”).
These estimates are directionally consistent with another empirical study that considers
bank responses to the Durbin Amendment. See Benjamin S. Kay, Mark D. Manuszak &
Cindy M. Vojtech, Bank Proﬁtability and Debit Card Interchange Regulation: Bank
Responses to the Durbin Amendment (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Fin. &
Econ. Discussion Series, Paper No. 77, 2014).
91. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne & Julian Morris, Unreasonable and
Disproportionate: How the Durbin Amendment Harms Poorer Americans and Small
Businesses 11–12 (2017), http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/icle-durbin_update_
2017_ﬁnal.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LTD-QD7K]. Pre-Durbin, the minimum deposit threshold averaged $110, but Durbin banks raised this by over 550%, to $720. See id. Usually,
maintenance fees are levied if a customer does not maintain a minimum balance in their
account. See generally Justin Song, Checking Account Fees: How Much Are They and How
Can They Be Waived?, Value Penguin, https://www.valuepenguin.com/banking/checkingaccount-fees [https://perma.cc/W853-2GHW] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) (detailing the
minimum deposits and fees of various checking account options).
92. Vitaly Bord provides suggestive evidence for this result, albeit in a different
setting. He ﬁnds that an increase in bank fees (stemming from mergers) leads to closures
of consumer checking accounts and a greater use of payday lending. Vitaly M. Bord, Bank
Consolidation and Financial Inclusion: The Adverse Effects of Bank Mergers on
Depositors 3, 47 (Dec. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholar.harvard.edu
/files/vbord/files/vbord_-_bank_consolidation_and_financial_inclusion_full.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CWD4-LXRX]. The biannual FDIC Survey of the Unbanked provides additional
evidence: The share of survey respondents who ascribe their lack of a bank account to
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recent FDIC Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, almost
30% of respondents who previously had a bank account reported that
they became unbanked because account fees were too high and
unpredictable.93
FIGURE 2: FREE CHECKING OFFERED (%), DURBIN VS. NON-DURBIN BANKS94
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high account fees more than doubled between 2011 and 2013, from 5.4% to 13.4%. See
FDIC, 2013 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households: Executive
Summary 6 fig.ES3 (2014), https://economicinclusion.gov/surveys/2013household/ documents
/2013_FDIC_Unbanked_Underbanked_HH_Survey_ExecSumm.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9JQG-88NM]; FDIC, 2011 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked
Households 69 (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2012_unbankedreport
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SHB-5FFK].
93. FDIC, 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households:
Appendix Tables 29 (2018), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017appendix.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SC3D-JN6L] [hereinafter FDIC, Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households]. This growth in the unbanked and underbanked population has
drawn attention and necessitates further study. A recent documentary, Spent, chronicles
the difficulties faced by nearly 70 million American families without access to the
traditional ﬁnancial sector. Spent: Looking for Change (The Young Turks 2014); see also
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J. on Reg. 121, 177–84 (2004) (discussing
barriers to banking for low-income families).
94. This chart was prepared to illustrate pre- and post-Durbin trends in free checking
for banks above the $10 billion asset threshold relative to banks below the threshold. The
dataset relied on is RateWatch, which surveys banks weekly to learn their fee-setting
practices. See About Us, RateWatch, https://www.rate-watch.com/about-us [https://
perma.cc/H3TN-WG4V] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). Free checking is deﬁned as a
checking account with a $0 monthly maintenance fee, regardless of the size of the
account. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 13–14; see also Claes
Bell, Smart Banking: ‘Free’ Checking Not Always Free, Bankrate (Jan. 20, 2015),
https://www.bankrate.com/banking/checking/smart-banking-free-checking-not-always-free/
[https://perma.cc/47UD-VMMR] (noting that the deﬁnition of a “free checking” account
varies from bank to bank).
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FIGURE 3: MONTHLY MAINTENANCE FEE ($), DURBIN VS. NON-DURBIN
BANKS95
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b. Merchant Impact. — Advocates of Durbin asserted that it would
“enable small businesses and merchants to lower their costs and provide
discounts for their customers.”96 As a result of Durbin, merchant interchange fees decreased by $6.5 billion annually. 97 In a perfectly
competitive world, these merchant savings would be passed through to
consumers in the form of lower prices. However, many were skeptical
that consumers would see any beneﬁt: Former Senator Mark Pryor
suggested that “the consumer probably ends up paying for [the
interchange regulation] . . . . They’ll get you. You’re going to pay for it
one way or another.”98

95. This chart was prepared to illustrate pre- and post-Durbin trends in monthly
maintenance fees for banks above the $10 billion asset threshold relative to banks below
the threshold. The dataset relied on is RateWatch, which surveys banks weekly to learn
their fee-setting practices. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
96. Press Release, Senator Dick Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate, Durbin Sends Letter to Wall Street Reform Conferees on Interchange Amendment
(May 25, 2010) (quoting Letter from Senator Dick Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate, to Senator Chris Dodd, Chairman of U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urban Affairs & Senator Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Fin. Servs.
Comm. (May 25, 2010)), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin sends-letter-to-wall-street-reform-conferees-on-interchange-amendment [https://perma.cc/
HKT3-7E5M].
97. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 17.
98. Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, Swiped: Banks, Merchants and Why Washington
Doesn’t Work for You, HuffPost (Apr. 28, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/28/swipe-fees-interchange-banks-merchants_n
_853574.html [https://perma.cc/AN23-9UAH].
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Senator Pryor may have been correct: Large retailers reported
Durbin was a boon to proﬁtability. For example, The Home Depot
anticipated a gain of $35 million per year from Durbin.99 These results
are consistent with prior work by Professor David Evans who, with a different event study approach, estimated that over time consumers would
lose between $22 and $25 billion from Durbin.100
Survey evidence suggests that retailers failed to fully pass through
savings: When surveyed, the sectors that experienced the greatest cost reduction report that they did not decrease prices in response to Durbin.101
The gas station serves as a useful measure to estimate the extent to
which Durbin lowers retail prices. This is for three reasons. First, gas is an
industry where interchange expense declines substantially post-Durbin:
15% of total savings accrue to gas retailers.102 Second, gas prices are set
locally, making it easier to identify a precise Durbin effect.103 Third, gas
products are standardized, allowing for identiﬁcation of relatively small
price movements.104 If gas stations fully passed through Durbin savings,
then prices would be expected to fall between $0.23 and $0.17 per gallon
for the average gas station.105

99. Carol Tomé, Exec. Vice President of Corp. Servs. & Chief Fin. Officer, The Home Depot,
Inc., Remarks at the Q4 2010 The Home Depot, Inc. Earnings Conference Call (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9ODMwMTB8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMX
xUeXBlPTM=&t=1 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
100. David S. Evans, Howard H. Chang & Steven Joyce, The Impact of the U.S. Debit
Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event Study Analysis 6 (Univ.
of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 658, 2013) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
101. See Zhu Wang, Scarlett Schwartz & Neil Mitchell, The Impact of the Durbin
Amendment on Merchants: A Survey Study, 100 Fed. Res. Bank of Rich. Econ. Q. 183, 202,
207 (2014). The authors surveyed 420 merchants across twenty-six sectors and found that
only four sectors were likely to have decreased prices in response to Durbin (art,
automobiles, sporting goods, and other) and that prices fell for just 1.2% of merchants
overall. Id. at 187, 194.
102. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 6.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 30.
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Figure 4 divides zip codes into ten deciles that range from areas
most exposed to Durbin (tenth decile) to least exposed (ﬁrst decile). Zip
codes are sorted using interchange data that allow observation of how
Durbin impacts different stations—speciﬁcally, some gas stations see few
debit cards (low Durbin exposure), and others see primarily debit cards
and have customers that only bank with large banks covered by Durbin
(high Durbin exposure). If merchants pass through Durbin savings,
prices should fall across all groups, with the largest price decreases for
the most-impacted zip codes (tenth decile). Each bar plots the Durbininduced gas price change in the six months following Durbin’s
enactment.106
FIGURE 4: DURBIN’S IMPACT ON GAS PRICES BY DECILE107
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106. Speciﬁcally, point estimates from the following regression are plotted, along with
the 95% conﬁdence interval: Margın
− Margın
= β × Impact + ϵ. In each regression,
“Impact” takes a value of 1 for the relevant decile and a value of 0 for the bottom decile.
These are estimates of how gas station margins (price net of wholesale cost) change based
on a zip code’s exposure to Durbin and controlling for regional and gas station level
differences. In each case, the control group is zip codes in the bottom decile, where
Durbin does not impact merchants’ interchange costs. Coefficients are plotted in dollars—
for example, for the tenth decile, the estimate is a price decrease of approximately $0.03.
Further detail is provided id. at 30–34.
107. This chart was prepared to illustrate the impact of Durbin on prices set by gas
retailers. For each decile of Durbin impact, this chart compares merchants whose
interchange expense falls post-Durbin to a matched control group of gas retailers who are
not similarly impacted. Data on Durbin impact are proprietary and made available by a
leading payments industry player, subject to robust privacy and data protection controls.
Data on gas station margins come from the Oil Price Information Service, which monitors
retail gas prices.
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While there is evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant price reduction
following Durbin for gas retailers in the top deciles, overall, there is
limited pass-through of Durbin savings.108 Gas retailers pass through only
a quarter of the $1 billion in interchange savings that accrue annually.109
Debit interchange regulation is thus a $770 million annual boon to gas
retailers’ proﬁtability.110 Extrapolating this estimate from the gas industry
more broadly, the analysis suggests that around 75% of the $6.5 billion in
annual Durbin savings went directly to retailers’ bottom line.111 Durbin
decreases consumer welfare by at least $1 billion annually.112
This estimate likely understates Durbin’s impact, because the new
debit interchange cap did not help all retailers. Small-ticket merchants
without sufficient market power to negotiate with card networks saw their
interchange rates rise, not fall, as the Board’s debit interchange cap
became a ﬂoor.113 These merchants raised prices.114 For example, Redbox,
which provides movie rentals through vending machines, increased
prices by 20% post-Durbin,115 while Parkmobile, a smartphone application that helps Washington, D.C. residents pay for parking, raised its fees
by more than 40%.116 Small business owners decried Durbin’s impact. An
108. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 31.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 26–31 (providing more detail on estimates of gas stations’ pass-through of
Durbin savings).
111. Id. at 6–7. There may be differences in pass-through across industries. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
112. One way to understand the Durbin Amendment is as a wealth transfer from banks
to businesses. One large retailer suggests that, despite the lack of discernible price
changes, consumers are in fact the ultimate beneﬁciaries. Telephone Interview with
Anonymous Representative (June 2017). The retailer was able to improve its customer
service because of declining interchange expense. Id. This is certainly plausible, but does
not seem to ﬁt with the consumer savings that Senator Durbin claimed regulation would
bring about. Retailers’ shareholders certainly beneﬁt as consumers, but this beneﬁt is
subsidized by higher checking account prices for low-income consumers. See supra text
accompanying notes 86–93.
113. See Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 16.
114. See, e.g., id. at 15.
115. Daniel Indiviglio, Angry that Redbox Is Hiking DVD Rental Prices? Blame
Congress, Atlantic (Oct. 28, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/
10/angry-that-redbox-is-hiking-dvd-rental-prices-blame-congress/247535/ [https://perma.cc/
2UWS=GU2S].
116. See Dina ElBoghadady, Parkmobile Fee Increase Causes Scuffle with Sen. Durbin,
Wash. Post (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/parkmobile fee-increase-causes-scuffle-with-sen-durbinparkmobile-fee-hike-causes-scuffle-with-senator/
2012/11/02/86c2a63c-2511-11e2-9313-3c7f59038d93_story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review). It was in fact Visa and Mastercard’s reaction to the Durbin Amendment, not
the legislation itself, which resulted in higher costs for Parkmobile. See Robin Sidel, DebitFee Cap Has Nasty Side Effect, Wall St. J. (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970204319004577084613307585768 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(reporting on the decisions of retailers to raise prices in response to higher rates from
debit card companies). Parkmobile eventually had to apologize when Senator Durbin
wrote a letter calling their claim “grossly misleading.” Id.
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owner of New York coffee houses said that in response to the new debit
fee cap: “My choice is to raise prices, discount for cash or get an ATM.”117
Another merchant said that when customers offer a card to buy a lowdollar item, like a banana, he gives it to them for free to forego the
interchange expense: “Just take the banana. Don’t give me the card.”118
The vending machine industry was especially hurt by Durbin—its
interchange fees increased by more than 200%.119 Visa struck agreements
with some vending machine payment processors;120 however, Mastercard
refused to negotiate a lower rate, leading many vending machines to
drop Mastercard debit from their list of accepted payment methods121
until a similar deal was eventually reached years later.122
4. Unintended Consequences of Intervention. — Durbin was not the ﬁrst
legislative attempt to rein in interchange fees. Interestingly, earlier iterations focused on credit rather than debit fees.123 This was because credit
interchange rates were historically higher,124 and legislators hoped to
dissuade banks and card networks from encouraging consumers to overuse credit cards, which can lead to expensive cycles of indebtedness.
The latter was exactly the rationale for the Reserve Bank of
Australia’s (RBA) 2003 decision to intervene in this market by capping
credit interchange fees at 0.55% of total transaction value.125 The RBA’s
primary objective “was to change the relative prices of credit cards and

117. Sidel, supra note 116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Think Coffee
owner Jason Scherr).
118. Carter & Grim, supra note 98 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cups
& Co. owner Charlie Chung).
119. Sidel, supra note 116.
120. Dig. Transactions News Staff, Apriva Extends Agreement with Visa to Offer
Discounted Vending-Machine Pricing, Dig. Transactions (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.
digitaltransactions.net/apriva-extends-agreement-with-visa-to-offer-discounted-vending-machine
-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/JD6Z-7TAX].
121. Id.
122. In January 2015, after a hiatus of more than three years, vending machines that
get payment services through USA Technologies began accepting Mastercard debit again.
Mastercard Int’l Inc. & USA Techs., Acceptance Agreement (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/896429/000157104915004372/t82294_ex10-2.htm [https://
perma.cc/PB34-9YKB].
123. See, e.g., Credit Card Fair Fee Act, H.R. 5546, 110th Cong. (2008); Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, S. 3252, 110th Cong. (2008); Credit Card
Interchange Fees Act, H.R. 6248, 110th Cong. (2008); Credit Card Fair Fee Act, S. 3086,
110th Cong. (2008) (sponsored by Sen. Durbin).
124. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 69, at 19.
125. See Background, Reserve Bank of Austl., https://www.rba.gov.au/payments-andinfrastructure/credit-cards/cc-fees-benchmark/background.html [https://perma.cc/4NZXSUCC] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) (“The effect of the standards has been to reduce the
average interchange fee from around 0.95 per cent of the credit card transaction value to
a little below 0.55 per cent.”).
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debit cards to cardholders . . . reducing the substantial incentive to use
credit cards over debit cards.”126
Despite the fact that the Australian case study was well known to
policymakers during the Durbin debate,127 the legislation eventually targeted debit interchange. This was in response to a substantial lobbying
effort by banks and credit card networks, which warned that any restriction on credit interchange would lead issuers to “squeeze credit and
raise the cost of credit cards at a time when the economy thirsts for credit
to sustain an economic recovery.”128 In fact, Durbin lauded the Amendment’s focus on debit interchange, noting that, as a result, it would avoid
any undesirable credit supply impact.129
However, in capping debit interchange rates, the Durbin Amendment
perversely increased the use of credit relative to its cheaper debit
counterpart. Debit is also a preferred means of transacting in the eyes of
many because it decouples ﬁnancial transacting from consumer borrowing, thereby reducing the likelihood that purchases will land consumers
in expensive cycles of debt.130 David Evans, an academic with extensive
background in payment systems, commented on the irony of Durbin
targeting debit, rather than credit:
Debit cards . . . are the responsible man’s plastic. You are only
using the money you have, it comes right out of your checking
account, so if you’re concerned about consumer debt, you want
people to be using debit cards more. . . . [I]t makes no sense for
the Dodd–Frank Act to include an amendment that’s going to
126. Michele Bullock, A Guide to the Card Payments System Reforms, Res. Bank Austl.
Bull., Sept. 2010, at 51, 59.
127. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees:
Implications and Consequences of the Durbin Amendment: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong.
12 (2011) (statement of Hon. Raskin) (“The Reserve Bank of Australia actually regulates
credit card interchange on a cost basis. . . . We are obviously looking just at debit card
interchange.”).
128. Keith Bradsher, U.S. Looks to Australia on Credit Card Fees, N.Y. Times (Nov. 24,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/25card.html
[https://perma.cc/U8V6-X3AB]. The implications of a potential credit squeeze were
especially worrying for minority groups, who historically have less credit access than their
white counterparts. Christian E. Weller, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Access Denied: Low-Income
and Minority Families Face More Credit Constraints and Higher Borrowing Costs 1
(2007), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/08/pdf/
credit_access.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA6K-YJXY] (“[Minority] families are still denied
credit more often than white families with the same income, and low-income families are
more often denied access to credit than middle-income and higher-income families—even
when low-income families apply for credit in line with their income and creditworthiness.”).
129. See Durbin, Statement on Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 8.
130. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373, 1421 (2004)
(“[T]he distorted pricing pattern observed in the credit card market is the product of the
underestimation bias on the one hand and the bundling of transacting and borrowing on
the other hand. . . . [T]he market has taken the ﬁrst step towards the unbundling . . . with
the invent of the debit card.”).
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make debit cards less available for consumers, and it’s going to
have the unavoidable consequences to push them towards
credit. I think it’s nuts.131
In response to Durbin, banks encouraged greater credit usage.132 For
example, spending on credit card rewards among big issuers more than
doubled since 2010133 while debit rewards programs were largely eliminated.134 Not surprisingly, as a result credit usage grew more in the three
years following Durbin’s enactment than in any other three-year period
since 2000.135 For megabanks, this growth was especially pronounced:
Credit usage by Wells Fargo customers increased by around 20% annually
in the years following Durbin, but debit growth rates fell to 2% annually. 136 For JP Morgan, credit usage grew by around 10% annually
following Durbin, but debit growth rates fell to only 4% a year.137 Figure 5
plots the average credit and debit growth rates for the ﬁve largest ﬁnancial institutions, which together account for more than 60% of total U.S.
deposits. Although debit growth falls signiﬁcantly following Durbin,
credit growth increases substantially, which is at least suggestive of banks
encouraging consumers to turn more frequently to credit cards, whose
interchange rates are left uncapped by Durbin. Visa’s CEO Joe Saunders
highlighted this trend and noted that it is “what one would expect” from
legislation capping debit, but not credit, interchange rates.138

131. Martin
Neal
Baily:
Reasonable
Regulation
of
Debit
Card
Fees (Transcript), PYMNTS (May 2, 2011), https://www.pymnts.com/news/2011/martinneal-baily-reasonable-regulation-of-debit-card-fees-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/BT9S-BAAD].
132. As an example, in September 2011, Chase distributed a brochure to explain that
credit is a superior payment instrument to debit for all purchases. Arin H. Smith, Note,
Durbin’s Defect: The Impact of Post-Recession Legislation on Low-Income Consumers, 89
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 363, 376 (2014).
133. Credit Card Rewards More than Doubled Since the Recession, New Study
Shows, Magnify Money Blog (May 4, 2017), http://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/news/
credit-card-issuers-doubled-spending-rewards840948580/ [https://perma.cc/4KDX-F55F].
134. Richard Kerr, Where Have All the Rewards Debit Cards Gone?, The Points
Guy (June 24, 2015), https://thepointsguy.com/2015/06/rewards-debit-cards-gone/
[https://perma.cc/4U5C-8FVS].
135. See Fed. Reserve Sys., The Federal Reserve Payments Study 2016 at 4 (2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/2016-payments-study20161222.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XKE-8GMG].
136. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85.
137. See id.
138. Thomson Reuters, Thomson Reuters Street Events Edited Transcript: V-Q1 2012
Visa Inc. Earnings Conference Call 12 (2012), https://s1.q4cdn.com/050606653/ﬁles/
doc_ﬁnancials/transcript/2012/V-Transcript-2012-Q1-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDG7N7P7].
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FIGURE 5: CREDIT AND DEBIT GROWTH RATE FOR LARGEST BANKS139
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1. The Policy Problem. — In 1980, credit card contracts were a page
long. Today, the average contract is more than thirty pages. Professor and
now-Senator Warren called this a move toward the inclusion of “tricks
and traps that would obscure the true cost of credit—and drive proﬁts
through the roof.”140 To some extent, she was correct.
Card fees have exploded since the late 1990s. This growth is tied to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.141
The case related to the interpretation of the National Bank Act, which
allows banks to charge interest rates based on the state in which the bank
resides. 142 In Smiley, Citibank levied penalty fees against a customer
(Smiley) that were legal in the state of its headquarters (South Dakota)
but not where Smiley resided (California).143 Shortly after the initial complaint, the Office of the Comptroller promulgated a rule explicitly
including late fees within the context of the National Bank Act,144 and in

139. Calculations for this Figure are from the Nilson Report, which reports debit and
credit usage for large issuers annually.
140. Sarlin, supra note 40.
141. 517 U.S. 735, 747 (1996).
142. Id. at 737.
143. Id. at 737–38.
144. Id. at 739–40.
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Smiley, the Supreme Court ruled that this interpretation was not
unreasonable.145
Consumer penalty fees more than doubled in the immediate
aftermath of Smiley, from just over $8 billion in 1995 to nearly $19 billion
in 1998.146 By 2004, penalty fees accounted for more than half of the
credit card fees U.S. cardholders paid in 2004 (12.5% of issuers’
revenues).147 Various credit card contract terms enabled issuers to extract
maximum fees. For example, card companies did not have to provide
notice of interest rate increases; they could raise them without warning
when cardholders applied for a mortgage or made a large purchase that
lowered their credit score.148 And although introductory teaser rates are
presented to consumers up front, myriad other fees—such as late fees,
over-limit fees, bounced-check fees, convenience and service fees, fees
for statement copies and replacement cards, foreign-currency conversion
fees, phone-payment convenience fees, wire-transfer fees, and balancetransfer fees—are buried deep in increasingly complex contracts.149 Consumer inattention to these nonsalient back-end terms precipitated a
status quo whereby consumers unknowingly incurred avoidable
expenses.150 And there was no incentive for new ﬁrms to offer more
transparent products—that is, making clear up front what the cost of
credit will be for consumers—because such honest brokers would have
no customers: Many consumers opted for products with a low up-front
price (0% APR for 18 months) and high penalty fees, even though they
145. Id. at 747.
146. Tamara Draut & Javier Silva, Dēmos, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Growth
of Credit Card Debt in the ‘90s, at 35 (2003), https://www.demos.org/sites/default
/files/publications/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y84-5YBX]
(highlighting how Smiley drastically increased credit card penalty fees).
147. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 47; see also Nadia Massoud, Anthony
Saunders & Barry Scholnick, The Cost of Being Late? The Case of Credit Card Penalty
Fees, 7 J. Fin. Stability 49, 50–51 (2011).
148. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 48 & n.132 (describing issuers’ practice
of “doubl[ing] or tripl[ing] interest rates when a cardholder’s credit score drops”).
149. Professors Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson discuss the tendency of ﬁrms to
shroud information from less sophisticated customers. One example they provide is bank
accounts:
For example, banks prominently advertise the virtues of their accounts,
but the marketing materials do not highlight the costs of an account
which include ATM usage fees, bounced check fees, minimum balance
fees, etc. Banks could compete on these costs, but they instead choose to
shroud them. Indeed, many bank customers do not learn the details of
the fee stricture until long after they have opened their accounts.
Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 505, 506 (2006).
150. See Gregory Bresiger, People Are Unaware of How Much They Spend on Bank
Fees, N.Y. Post (July 16, 2016), https://nypost.com/2016/07/16/people-are-unaware-ofhow-much-they-spend-on-bank-fees/ [https://perma.cc/9ADB-WG5P] (“The main reason
for the sky-high fees is that the customer is unaware of them.”).
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would end up paying more in the long run in late fees and higher
interest rates if they were delinquent.151 Loss-leader pricing to exploit
consumers’ irrationality was responsible for substantial credit card
revenues in the precrisis period.152
2. Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. — In response to
widespread outrage, interventions in this market began during the Recession. In May 2007, the Federal Reserve proposed revisions to the Truth in
Lending Act, and in February 2008, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke testiﬁed before Congress that the Federal Reserve planned to
use its authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive credit card practices.153 In
May 2008, the Fed proposed rules focused on protecting customers from
unexpected increases in interest rates or penalty fees, ending two-cycle
billing,154 and prohibiting card issuers from creating a “cycle of debt” for
subprime borrowers by opening accounts likely to generate astronomical
fee revenue.155
In tandem, Congress focused on this market. Carolyn Maloney (New
York Democrat) introduced the “Credit Cardholder’s Bill of Rights,”
which passed the House in September 2008 but was never considered in
the Senate.156 The bill was reintroduced in January 2009, only one month
after the Federal Reserve issued its ﬁnal rules to regulate card company
practices.157 In April and May 2009, both the House and the Senate
overwhelmingly passed (357-70 and 90-5 votes, respectively 158 ) the
151. See Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu & Nicholas S.
Souleles, Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?, 4 Rev. Corp. Fin. Stud. 239,
242 (2015) (“A substantial fraction of consumers (about 40%) . . . chose the suboptimal
contract, with a few non-fee-paying consumers incurring hundreds of dollars of readily
avoidable interest charges.”).
152. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse Selection in the Credit Market 20–22 (June
17, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that
consumers are overly sensitive to promotional teaser rates and hypothesizing that this is
because they underestimate the probability that they will later still be borrowing at higher,
post-teaser rates and fail to optimize with these post-teaser prices in mind).
153. Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 19, at 4 (providing a detailed discussion of the
CARD Act’s staged legislative history).
154. That is, when a consumer pays the entire balance one month but fails to do so
the following month, and the bank calculates interest for the second month using days in
the previous cycle as well as the current cycle.
155. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Highlights of Final Rules
Regarding Credit Card Accounts (Dec. 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/pressreleases/files/bcreg20081218a1.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9DQ-7MX5] (proposing rules
to “prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices by banks in connection with credit card
accounts”).
156. Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, The Credit Cardholder’s Bill of Rights (Feb. 6,
2008), https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/credit-cardholders%E2%80%99bill-rights-balanced-reform [https://perma.cc/2ACJ-3KJ2].
157. Id.
158. 155 Cong. Rec. 12,833 (2009) (Senate vote); 155 Cong. Rec. 11,204 (2009)
(House vote).
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reintroduced bill—the CARD Act. 159 The CARD Act superseded the
Federal Reserve’s rules.160 The CARD Act adopted many of the same
prohibitions as the Federal Reserve (such as limiting unexpected interest
rate hikes161) and added terms to reduce credit availability for college
students,162 which regulators hoped would decrease the likelihood that
young borrowers would ﬁnd themselves stuck in cycles of debt.163 The
CARD Act’s ban on certain contract terms was meant to address the salience problem in this market: Consumers, enticed by attractive offers of
0% initial interest rates, unknowingly paid high back-end fees (such as
penalty fees, interest rate increases, and over-limit fees).164 By decreasing
card networks’ ability to generate revenue from some of these hidden
levers, CARD Act advocates hoped to decrease the overall cost of credit
for consumers or at the very least make sure that consumers appreciated
the true cost of credit.
3. Impact of Regulatory Intervention. — The CARD Act changed the
economics of the credit card business by turning a short-term revolving
unsecured loan, which could reprice when signals of consumer riskiness
materialized, into a longer-term unsecured loan with lower ability to
price discriminate by risk type. Opponents of the CARD Act warned that
the result would be higher interest rates for consumers across the board
and a decrease in credit supply.165 Empirical evidence (detailed below)
159. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24,
123 Stat. 1734 (codiﬁed as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
160. Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 19, at 1.
161. § 101, 123 Stat. at 1735–36 (requiring advance notice of increase in interest rate).
162. § 301, 123 Stat. at 1747–48 (prohibiting extensions of credit to underage
consumers).
163. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 34 (discussing Haiyan Shui and
Lawrence Ausubel’s ﬁndings that consumers routinely pay more interest than they must).
This Article focuses on the aspects of the CARD Act that regulated issuers’ back-end credit
card contract terms rather than other features such as the requirement that issuers assess
borrowers’ ability to repay before providing credit. These features also had unintended
consequences: Until the CARD Act was amended, for example, one group of borrowers
who found their access to credit restricted was spouses or partners who do not work
outside the home. See The CFPB Amends Card Act Rule to Make It Easier for Stay-atHome Spouses and Partners to Get Credit Cards, CFPB (Apr. 29, 2013),
https://www.consumerﬁnance.gov/about-us/newsroom/the-cfpb-amends-card-act-rule-tomake-it-easier-for-stay-at-home-spouses-and-partners-to-get-credit-cards/ (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
164. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 33–37, 46–52 (discussing the poorly
informed behavior of consumers of credit cards and the changes that credit card issuers
have developed over time to exploit this consumer behavior).
165. See Connelly, supra note 13; see also Tse, supra note 42. The CARD Act
restrictions, such as the prohibition on rate increases for existing balances and the
limitations on penalties and over-the-limit fees, severely hamper the ability to manage
customer risks. Not only does this result in higher rates than would otherwise apply
without the CARD Act, but those customers who might otherwise pay lower rates are
subsidizing those who should pay higher rates, and credit availability may be constrained.
See Letter from Jeffrey P. Bloch, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, to Monica
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illustrates that critics were wrong—the CARD Act increased overall
consumer welfare. It is important to understand why these concerns were
overblown.
Estimates suggest the CARD Act reduced overall credit card fees by
nearly $25 per account annually, resulting in total cost savings for credit
card users of nearly $12 billion per year.166 These savings were largest
(nearly $60 per account per year) for the least-creditworthy borrowers
(those with a FICO score below 660).167 Overall, these savings represent a
decrease in account fees of over 25%.168
Despite early anecdotal evidence to the contrary,169 most academic
work ﬁnds little support for the notion that banks offset the CARD Act’s
losses through increases in interest rates or other fees.170 There appears
to be no increase in interest rates in response to the CARD Act, either on
existing accounts or on new accounts, which are less constrained by the
CARD Act’s repricing restrictions.171 However, there is some evidence
that unregulated fees less salient to consumers—such as cash advance
APRs—increased slightly in response to the CARD Act.172

Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, CFPB (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.consumerbankers.
com/sites/default/files/021913_CBA-Response-to-CFPB-RFI-to-Study-the-Effects-of-TheCARD-Act-on-the-Credit-Card-Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4K7-V67L].
166. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at
114. This study provides the most exhaustive empirical work done on the impact of the
CARD Act to date. The authors use a panel data set covering 160 million credit card
accounts and adopt a difference-in-difference research design, comparing changes in
outcomes over time for consumer credit cards, which were subject to the new regulations,
to small business cards, which were exempted. Id. at 113.
167. Id. at 114. Those with a FICO score above 660 experienced a smaller decline in
fees, of $7.59 per account. Id.
168. For accounts with FICO scores below 660, late fees decline by 1.5 percentage
points over both implementation phases, from a pre–CARD Act mean of 5.9% (1.5/5.9 =
25.4%). Id.
169. Connelly, supra note 13.
170. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at
115 (“We ﬁnd little offsetting response in terms of pricing. Using the same difference-indifferences approach, we ﬁnd no difference in anticipatory increase in interest charges
prior to the CARD Act, and no evidence of a sharp or gradual increase following the
CARD Act implementation periods.”) One recent exception is the work of economist Scott
Nelson, which suggests that the CARD Act’s limits on interest-rate adjustment resulted in
across-the-board higher interest rates on average for all borrowers at origination. See Scott
T. Nelson, Essays on Household Finance and Credit Market Regulation 23 (June 12, 2018)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review). However, he concludes that the reduction in lender rents outweighs
the impact of higher prices, “so that on net, the Act’s restrictions allow consumers of all
credit scores to capture higher surplus on average.” Nelson, Private Information, supra
note 19.
171. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at
153–58.
172. Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 19, at 997.
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4. Unintended Consequences of Intervention. — Evidence on the CARD
Act’s impact on credit supply is less clear, but there is some evidence that
the Federal Reserve’s 2008 rule proposals, which directly inﬂuenced the
CARD Act’s eventual reforms, triggered a decline in credit availability. But
given that this earlier proposal coincides with the Recession, it is difficult
to establish causally that decreased credit supply is attributable to imminent pricing restrictions rather than to the general economic downturn.173
Recent work suggests that the CARD Act did somewhat decrease
credit supply for subprime borrowers.174 The existence of a supply-side
credit effect, especially for subprime borrowers, is consistent with
industry commentary:175 In its recent assessment of the CARD Act, the
American Bankers Association (ABA) indicated that the Act decreased
credit availability for subprime borrowers.176 Speciﬁcally, the ABA noted
that from 2008 to 2016, total credit card accounts for superprime borrowers rose from 151 million to 176 million while total credit card accounts
for subprime borrowers fell from 89 million to 73 million.177
Still, on aggregate, this credit-supply effect appears outweighed by a
decrease in lender rents.178 The overall equilibrium effect of the CARD
Act is an increase in consumer surplus estimated to be approximately $12
billion annually. 179 This ﬁnding is consistent with estimates from the
CFPB, which argues that the total cost of consumer credit declined by
two percentage points between 2008 and 2012.180

173. Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 19, at 1 (making clear that it is difficult to
determine whether the cause of account closures “was the economic downturn or
preemptive action in anticipation of the new legislation”).
174. Nelson, Private Information, supra note 19, at 4.
175. See, e.g., Connelly, supra note 13 (“[A] law [the CARD Act] hailed as the most
sweeping piece of consumer legislation in decades has helped make it more difficult for
millions of Americans to get credit, and made that credit more expensive.”); see also
Comment Letter from Nessa Eileen Feddis & Brian Murphy, Am. Bankers Ass’n, to Monica
Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, CFPB 2 (June 8, 2017) https://www.aba.com//media/documents/comment-letter/cl-card-act2017june.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN3VBTG9] [hereinafter Am. Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Credit Card Market] (“The availability
of credit has declined, particularly for subprime borrowers who have no, limited, or poor
credit histories.”).
176. See Am. Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Credit Card Market, supra note 175.
177. Id. at 3.
178. See Nelson, Private Information, supra note 19, at 3.
179. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at
111.
180. CFPB, CARD Act Report: A Review of the Impact of the CARD Act on the
Consumer Credit Card Market 5 (2013), https://ﬁles.consumerﬁnance.gov/f/201309
_cfpb_card-act-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWP2-ZWMW] (“[T]he total cost of credit . . .
declined by 194 basis points from Q4 2008 to Q4 2012.”).
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Overdraft

1. The Policy Problem. — An overdraft occurs when a customer
attempts to withdraw an amount from their checking account, either
through an ATM withdrawal or point-of-sale purchase, that exceeds the
funds available in their account. Banks earn overdraft revenue by
allowing customers to complete these transactions for a fee. Historically,
institutions determined whether to cover overdraft transactions on a
case-by-case basis based on customer and overdraft characteristics. In the
early 2000s, banks began transitioning to automated overdraft programs—often designed by third-party vendors 181 —to maximize bank
overdraft revenue by, for example, ordering customer overdrafts from
largest to smallest, which can increase the frequency of overdrafts, and
advertising overdraft programs to customers.182 To study the growth in
overdraft revenue and how it has shifted as a result of recent reform, I
rely on data from bank regulatory ﬁlings. As Figure 6 illustrates, service
charges on deposit accounts183 increased by more than 90% between
1999 and 2009. In fact, in 2006, overdraft fees accounted for around 6%
of banks’ total net operating revenues.184

181. See FDIC, FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, at III, 50 (2008),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/fdic138_report_ﬁnal_v508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WU93-599G] [hereinafter FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft
Programs].
182. Id. at III, 36–38.
183. Until 2015, banks were not required to report overdraft fees as a line item on
ﬁnancial ﬁlings. See Peter Smith, Report: FDIC Data Shows that Banks Collected $11.45
Billion in Overdraft Fees in 2017, Ctr. for Responsible Lending (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/media/report-fdic-data-shows-banks-collected-1145billion-overdraft-fees-2017 [https://perma.cc/UY7D-6396] (“Since 2015, the FDIC has
collected and released information about these harmful penalty fees from banks that have
$1 billion or more in assets.”). Instead, “Service Charges on Deposit Accounts” includes
overdraft and other fees, such as monthly maintenance fees on deposit accounts. Fed. Fin.
Insts. Examination Council, Instructions for Preparation of Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income: FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041, at RI-9 (2019),
https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC031_FFIEC041_201906_i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UCP7-BY3H] (describing the components of the “Service Charges on
Deposit Accounts” line item). However, overdraft fees, at least prior to changes to
Regulation E, were responsible for a sizable fraction of service charges on deposit
accounts. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at III, 56.
Speciﬁcally, the FDIC estimated that fees related to nonsufficient funds (NSF) were 74% of
total service charges on deposit accounts reported in 2006. Id.
184. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at 56.
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FIGURE 6: SERVICE CHARGES ON DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS (ANNUAL)185
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Overdraft revenue is generated primarily by repeat overdrafters.
Before the Recession, about 75% of accounts had no overdraft incidents,
12% had one to four, 5% had ﬁve to nine, 4% had ten to nineteen, and
only about 5% had more than twenty overdrafts annually.186 Customers
with more than ten overdraft transactions—fewer than 10% of all
checking account customers—accrued 84% of the reported overdraft
and nonsufficient funds (NSF) fees.187 These customers were typically low
income: In 2006, 38% of low-income customers overdrafted, compared to
only 22% of their high-income counterparts.188 Low-income customers
were also about twice as likely to be frequent overdrafters.189
Overdraft is essentially a very high-interest loan: If paid within two
weeks, a $27 overdraft fee190 for a $20 overdraft incident is equivalent to a
bank loan with an APR of 3,520%. Banks offer cheaper ways to complete
these transactions, for example, by opening an overdraft line of credit
185. This chart was prepared to illustrate the impact of changes in the overdraft
market. The data come from the bank regulatory “Call Reports.” Banks do not report
overdraft income explicitly; instead, they report service fees on deposit accounts, which
includes overdraft, but also revenue from monthly maintenance fees, ATM out-of-network
fees, check-cashing fees, and the like. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, supra note
183, at RI-9 to RI-10.
186. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at IV.
187. CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 18.
188. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at V. Notably, in
some areas, “low-income” customers earned a median annual income of less than $30,000.
Id.
189. Id. (explaining that 7.5% of low-income customers experienced twenty or more
overdraft incidents in a year, compared to only 3.8% of high-income customers).
190. This is the median for the FDIC study. Id.

1554

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:1519

(usually an APR of around 18%) or linking a checking account to a
savings or credit card account (costing a $5 ﬂat fee). 191 Given the
availability of cheaper alternatives, banks’ ability to generate overdraft
revenue, especially from repeat overdrafters, is puzzling. One possible
explanation for overdraft incidence is consumer inattention—nearly all
consumers who overdraft are unaware that they are about to overdraw
their accounts and unfamiliar with the magnitude of overdraft
penalties.192 The lack of salience of these fees to the consumers who bear
them enables banks to generate large overdraft proﬁts.
Prior to recent changes, bank customers were automatically opted in
to overdraft protection. Given the rapid increase in overdraft fees since
the early 1990s and their disproportionate incidence on low-income
customers, both popular commentators 193 and regulators 194 voiced
concern.
2. Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. — In 2005, the Federal
Reserve amended Regulation DD, which implements the Truth in
Savings Act, to require additional disclosures about overdraft services and
rein in misleading advertisements.195 Banks were also required to disclose
total overdraft fees incurred in periodic account statements.196 Regulators hoped disclosures would nudge customers away from overdraft and
push them toward cheaper alternatives.197
Despite this intervention, overdraft fee income for banks and credit
unions rose 35% from 2006 to 2008. 198 The Board then amended
191. Id. at III.
192. Pew Ctr. on the States, Overdraft America: Confusion and Concerns About Bank
Practices 4 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedﬁles/pcs_assets/
2012/sciboverdraft20america1pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3M8-5SZK].
193. See, e.g., Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards Is a Boon
for Banks, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/yourmoney/credit-and-debit-cards/09debit.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). One
New York Times editorial called for regulators to “move quickly and aggressively to protect
consumers.” Editorial, Debit Card Trap, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/08/20/opinion/20thu1.html [https://perma.cc/3ZY7-NSNZ]. The editorial offered vivid anecdotes—for example, of a college student who “made seven small
purchases including coffee and school supplies that totaled $16.55 and was hit with
overdraft fees that totaled $245.” Id.; see also Editorial, That $35 Cup of Coffee, N.Y. Times
(Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/opinion/14sat2.html [https://perma.cc
/NAU3-NKDC].
194. See FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at II–V
(describing a 2008 FDIC study to gather data on overdraft programs in response to the
growth in automated overdraft).
195. 12 C.F.R. § 230.11(b) (2006).
196. Id. § 230.11(a).
197. Truth in Savings, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,582, 29,583 (May 24, 2005) (codiﬁed at 12
C.F.R. § 230.11) (explaining the Board’s rationale for adopting new regulations).
198. Leslie Parrish, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Overdraft Explosion: Bank Fees for
Overdrafts Increase 35% in Two Years 5 (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/
overdraft-loans/research-analysis/crl-overdraft-explosion.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW97-2B8Q].
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Regulation E to change the default rules for overdraft.199 In January
2009, it requested comment on two policy defaults: (1) an opt-out
default, which would prohibit banks from assessing overdraft fees unless
customers were given notice and a reasonable opportunity to opt out of
overdraft protection and chose not to; and (2) an opt-in default, which
would prohibit banks from assessing overdraft fees unless customers
affirmatively opted in.200
The ﬁnal rule adopted an opt-in approach.201 In selecting this policy
default, the Board speciﬁcally pointed to the fact that consumers
unwittingly bear these fees. The Board hoped to avoid situations going
forward where consumers “may unintentionally overdraw their account
based on the erroneous belief that a transaction would be paid only if the
consumer has sufficient funds in the account to cover it.”202 Because
consumers are likely to adhere to established defaults, 203 the Board
believed the opt-in regime would help prevent expensive and frequent
overdraft incidents.204
The new default rule, which prohibits levying overdraft fees unless
consumers actively opt in to overdraft protection, was meant to be a
strong nudge against overdraft protection: The Board concluded that
consumers would prefer such transactions be declined and amended the
default rule accordingly.205 This view is consistent with the Board’s own
internal testing206 and surveys,207 which demonstrate that about half of

199. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17 (2010).
200. Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 5212, 5215 (proposed Jan. 29, 2009)
(codiﬁed at 12 C.F.R. § 205.17).
201. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17. Changes to Regulation E involve only ATM and point-of-sale
overdrafts. Overdrafts for check or scheduled recurring payments are not subject to the
new opt-in requirement. Id. § 205.17(b)(2).
202. Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,033, 59,039 (Nov. 17, 2009) (codiﬁed
at 12 C.F.R. § 205.17).
203. As support for this proposition, the Federal Reserve Board cited Brigitte C.
Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and
Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. Econ. 1149 (2001); and Gabriel D. Carroll, James J. Choi, David
Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions,
124 Q.J. Econ. 1639 (2009). Both studies examine automatic enrollment in 401(k) savings
plans and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in employee participation when the default rule is
enrollment rather than a default that requires employees agree to participation. See
Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,038 n.25.
204. But see Todd Zywicki, Behavioral Law and Economics and Bank Overdraft
Protection, Volokh Conspiracy (Nov. 20, 2013), http://volokh.com/2013/11/20/behavioral
-law-economics-bank-overdraft-protection/ [https://perma.cc/3U3D-PBSY] (“[T]he propensity
to opt-in is positively correlated with the number of overdrafts.”).
205. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,038.
206. See Macro Int’l Inc., Design and Testing of Overdraft Disclosures: Phase Two, at
v–vi (2009), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20091112a4.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2WVJ-36GT] (reporting that “about half [of overdrafters] said that
they would have preferred that the bank deny the transaction”).
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overdrafters would prefer transactions incurring overdraft fees not be
completed.
3. Impact of Regulatory Intervention. — In commenting on the likely
impact of changes to Regulation E, industry experts predicted that the
result would be higher fees or a reduction in bank services given that
“overdraft fees . . . subsidize other checking account features consumers
enjoy, such as maintenance fee-free checking accounts, or free online bill
payment.”208 Understanding the impact of changes to the overdraft optin regime—and the extent to which these are offset by sophisticated
ﬁrms—can usefully inform debates about the desirability of behavioral
policy interventions in consumer ﬁnance markets.
Figure 6 above shows that overdraft revenue decreased signiﬁcantly
following changes to the overdraft default rules. Service charges on deposit accounts declined by 14% over the year following the Board’s
changes. Banks do not appear to have recovered these losses.209
Have overdraft losses been offset by increases in other types of bank
fees? Figure 2 above illustrates that free checking has decreased by 40%
since 2010. However, this decrease is concentrated in banks above the
$10 billion Durbin cutoff. Unlike Durbin, the new overdraft opt-in regime applies to large and small banks alike. In fact, smaller banks, which
were more dependent on overdraft for revenue, were hit harder by the
new opt-in default.210 As such, the fee increases observed appear to be
more related to Durbin than to changes in banks’ overdraft policies.211
But we know that the share of bank customers opted in to overdraft
protection (and thus susceptible to incurring overdraft fees) decreased
signiﬁcantly following the new rule, from 100% to 16.1%.212 Even among
frequent overdrafters, only 45% have opted in to overdraft protection.213
207. A 2012 Pew study reported that 75% of people who reported overdrafting said
that they would have preferred the nonrecurring debit transactions be declined. Pew Ctr.
on the States, supra note 192, at 2, 5.
208. Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,039.
209. In fact, overdraft revenue may have decreased further since 2010. Banks’ “Service
Charges on Deposit Accounts” line item includes monthly maintenance fees, which
doubled for banks above the $10 billion threshold in response to the Durbin Amendment.
See supra Figure 3.
210. CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 60 (“Overdraft and NSF
fees also compose 37% of study banks’ total deposit service charges and . . . overdraft and
NSF fees make up an even larger share—over 60%—of total deposit service charges among
community banks.”). As a result, smaller banks are more focused on opting in customers
to overdraft protection. Community banks, for example, report opt-in rates of around
60%. Willis, supra note 55, at 1184 (citing CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note
35, at 29).
211. Disentangling the two, however, is difficult: Both were enacted around 2010.
212. See CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 29. The opt-in rate is
22.3% for new accounts, which are easier to opt in to because they involve more direct
contact with consumers. Id. at 30.
213. Id.
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4. Unintended Consequences of Intervention. — One way to interpret the
higher opt-in rate for frequent overdrafters is that motivated banks seek
to avoid the opt-in default for highly lucrative customers. The economic
rationale for such behavior is clear: Prior to changes to the default rule,
9% of customers generated 84% of overdraft and NSF revenue.214 By opting in just this 9%, banks could recover nearly all of their overdraft
revenue. However, another interpretation of this evidence is that frequent overdrafters like overdraft as a product—that is, they prefer overdraft protection to their transactions being declined.215 Disentangling
these two explanations is challenging, but well-designed regulation will
discourage targeting of ﬁnancially vulnerable consumers while still
making overdraft as a product available to consumers who want it.
Table 1 below summarizes the three postcrisis interventions discussed in Part I.

214. Id. at 18.
215. Professor Cass Sunstein suggests this rationale: For frequent overdrafters, “[i]t is
plausible to think that opting in is a good idea. If they cannot borrow from their bank,
they might have to borrow from someone else—which would mean a level of
inconvenience . . . and potentially equivalent or higher interest rates.” Cass R. Sunstein,
Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 210, 215 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nudges
vs. Shoves].
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF INTERVENTIONS

Postcrisis
Intervention

Policy Problem

Regulatory
Approach to
Problem
Solving

Impact of
Regulatory
Intervention

Unintended
Consequences of
Intervention

Durbin
Amendment

Interchange
became a large
operating cost
for merchants
as use of credit
and debit for
payment
exploded.

Impose a $0.22
cap on debit
interchange
collected from
merchants.

Bank
interchange
revenue fell by
$6.5 billion
annually.
Monthly
checking
account fees
doubled. Free
checking
decreased
substantially.

Intervention
increased checking
account fees for
consumers.
Intervention may
have shifted some
consumers to
credit. Intervention
increased
interchange fees for
small-ticket
merchants.

CARD Act

Credit card
contracts
increased in
complexity.
Unanticipated
consumer fees
arose.

Restrict
unannounced
fee increases
and back-end
penalty fees.

There were fee
reductions of
$12 billion
annually.
There is little
evidence of
offsetting
increase in
interest rates.

There is some
evidence of
anticipatory
decreases in credit
availability.

Overdraft OptIn Rule

Overdraft
revenue grew
by more than
100% in a
decade, due to
automated
overdraft
programs
aimed at
generating
revenue by, for
example,
ordering
transactions for
maximum
overdrafts.

Prohibit
overdraft
protection
(and thus fees)
unless
customers opt
in, otherwise
the transaction
is denied.

The share of
customers who
opted in to
overdraft
protection
decreased
from 100% to
16% (22% for
new
customers).

Banks dependent
on overdraft may
target frequent
overdrafters for opt
in: 10% are
responsible for 85%
of overdraft
revenue. These
consumers are
often the poorest
and least financially
sophisticated.
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II. LESSONS OF THESE INTERVENTIONS
This Article serves as a clear, empirical response to those in the
regulatory community who believe consumer ﬁnancial regulation will
increase overall welfare regardless of the market particulars216 and to
those who believe any regulatory intervention will be ill fated.217 Neither
group paints an accurate picture, and my work offers three primary
lessons: First, the regulation of nonsalient prices is desirable. This is
because banks exploit consumers’ behavioral limitations—like overoptimism (for example, consumers’ mistaken beliefs that they will never
be delinquent in paying credit card bills) and inattention (for example,
consumers’ failure to read checking account contracts, which explicitly
detail the signiﬁcant costs of overdrafting). Banks charge exorbitant nonsalient prices without worrying about losing customers. As such,
policymakers must bring discipline to these markets by restricting
shrouded pricing.
Second, in consumer ﬁnance markets, low-income consumers tend
to pay higher prices than their high-income counterparts. The existence
of inequitable cross-subsidization calls for regulatory intervention. These
cross-subsidies arise for two distinct reasons: (1) High-income consumers
are less likely to bear hidden penalty fees—because they tend to be more
attentive and because they are wealthier, so they are less likely to overdraw their accounts or be delinquent on a credit card payment; and (2)
high-income consumers have access to the most attractive ﬁnancial
products. For example, they transact with payment instruments that provide rewards for retail purchases. Cash users receive no similar beneﬁts,
216. See, for example, Senator Dick Durbin and Representative Peter Welch’s
response to calls to repeal Durbin, arguing aggressively in favor of regulatory intervention
in this market: “Make no mistake—Visa, Mastercard[,] and the big banks want to scare
Congress and regulators away from exerting oversight . . . . They think that by discrediting
Congressional efforts to rein in their rigged schemes in the past, they will enhance their
ability to get away with rigged schemes in the future.” Dick Durbin & Peter Welch,
Sideswiped: The Hidden Motive Behind the Big Bank Push to Repeal Swipe Fee Reform,
Medium (Sept. 28, 2016), https://medium.com/@SenatorDurbin/sideswiped-the-hiddenmotive-behind-the-big-bank-push-to-repeal-swipe-fee-reform-504b9a097827 [https://perma.cc
/U9YC-M828].
217. Professor Todd Zywicki has been highly critical of the three regulatory
interventions studied in this article. See Todd Zywicki, No, the Credit Card Act Is Not a
Free Lunch, Wash. Post (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/01/13/no-the-credit-card-act-is-not-a-free-lunch/ (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (criticizing the CARD Act); Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne &
Julian Morris, Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The U.S. Experience 29
(Geo. Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-18, 2014),
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1418.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4SWD-YE8F] (criticizing the Durbin Amendment to Dodd–Frank ﬁnancial
reform legislation); G. Michael Flores & Todd Zywicki, Overdraft Protection Rules Could
Hurt Consumers More than They Help, Mercatus Ctr. (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.
mercatus.org/expert_commentary/overdraft-protection-rules-could-hurt-consumers-morethey-help [https://perma.cc/5LMZ-43DT] (criticizing overdraft reform).
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and the result is a regressive transfer from low-income, creditless
consumers to their wealthier counterparts.
Third, regulators should follow what banks do—not what they say.
Every time regulators act, banks caution that consumers will be hurt,
because affected institutions will have no choice but to pass costs through
to consumers. These warnings lead many academics and policymakers to
be skeptical of the desirability of intervention. However, how banks
respond to regulation is ultimately an empirical question, and one that
this Article undertakes with surprising results. Despite bank assertions to
the contrary, in many instances, impacted institutions eat the losses from
regulation, rather than passing them through to their customers. Being
too beholden to how we believe banks will respond to regulation—rather
than following the data to understand how banks actually respond to
regulation—leads to an overly pessimistic view of regulatory efficacy. This
Part elaborates on these lessons in greater detail.
A.

Regulators Should Target Nonsalient Prices

This Article considers the efficacy of postcrisis price regulations in
the debit interchange, credit card, and overdraft markets.
While these three price regulations appear similar, the empirical
analysis in Part I demonstrates their varied efficacy. Each intervention decreased banks’ fee revenue, targeted the same ﬁnancial institutions,
received praise from consumer advocates as welfare enhancing, and
inspired derision from banks as being likely to hurt the same consumers
it sought to help. Net savings from the CARD Act are on the order of $12
billion annually.218 Additionally, changes to the overdraft regime have
improved consumer welfare. The new opt-in default rules decreased the
share of consumers eligible to incur overdraft fees by nearly 85%.219
Service charges on deposit accounts declined by around 15%, and these
losses have not been recovered. 220 In stark contrast, consumers are
harmed by Durbin’s cap on debit interchange fees. Durbin has decreased
bank interchange revenue (and merchant interchange expense) by
around $6.5 billion annually,221 and banks have responded to this intervention by doubling account fees.222 The share of bank customers with
access to a free checking account declined by more than 40 percentage

218. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at
145.
219. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
220. See supra Figure 6. There is no precise line item that captures total overdraft
revenue. Instead, “Service Charges on Deposit Accounts” includes overdraft revenue as
well as other account fees, like monthly maintenance fees. It is estimated that overdraft
fees account for over 60% of total service charges. Overdraft revenue likely fell by even
more than 15%, as bank account fees rose around the same period. Id.
221. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 3.
222. See id. at 34.
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points, from 60% of customers to around 20%.223 And merchants—who
save around $6.5 billion annually from Durbin—largely pocketed the
reduction in interchange expense, and their proﬁtability rose.224
Why do three price regulations provoke such different responses by
banks and, consequently, have such varied implications for consumer
welfare? The answer is salience.
Consumers tend to ignore certain aspects of product prices.
Although they pay attention to salient terms—the sticker price of a car,
the introductory APR offer on a new credit card solicitation—they ignore
nonsalient terms—for example, the cost of reﬁnancing and the penalty
for late payments.225 As consumer ﬁnance has become an increasingly doit-yourself industry, consumers are responsible for an increasingly intricate set of ﬁnancial decisions.226 Firms offer more products with greater
complexity. For example, the sheer number of credit cards consumers
can choose from has exploded, with each offering different terms and
rewards.227 These product differences are detailed in contracts that have
increased in length from one page to more than thirty pages on average,
giving credit card issuers more room to add hidden terms and fees to
behemoth agreements that no reasonable consumer will ever read.228
1. Price Regulation Can Tackle Salience Problems. — Regulations that
curb banks’ ability to generate revenue from nonsalient pricing terms are
beneﬁcial. This is especially true if the ﬁnancial sector is dominated by
large institutions that are able to exercise monopoly power. When large
ﬁrms have market power, high nonsalient prices mean excess proﬁts for
banks at the expense of consumers.229 When regulations curb nonsalient

223. See supra Figure 2.
224. See supra Figure 4 (illustrating, through gas prices, how merchants responded to
Durbin).
225. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 149, at 506 (pointing out that ﬁrms regularly
choose to hide information from customers; for example, banks shroud fees and compete
only on prices that consumers are attentive to).
226. See John Y. Campbell, Howell E. Jackson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Peter Tufano,
Consumer Financial Protection, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 91, 91–92 (2011) (“Households are
expected to make decisions about pension plan contributions and payouts, to choose from
a wide array of credit instruments to fund everything from home purchase to short-term
cash needs, and more generally to assume a greater level of responsibility for their
ﬁnancial well-being.”).
227. See generally David S. Evans, The Growth and Diffusion of Credit Cards in
Society, Payment Card Econ. Rev., Winter 2004, at 59, 61, https://ssrn.com/abstract
=653382 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting the growth and diffusion of
credit cards).
228. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, Democracy Summer 2007, at 8, 11–12
(“The additional terms were not designed to make life easier for the customer. Rather,
they were designed in large part to add unexpected—and unreadable—terms that favor
the card companies.”).
229. The Agarwal model makes clear that to get overall consumer beneﬁt from
regulation (which means that consumers were paying above cost before), the regulation
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prices—for example, by capping them (like the CARD Act’s restriction
on late fees) or by requiring consumers to opt in before incurring them
(like changes to the overdraft default rules)—banks have a choice. They
can offset losses by increasing salient prices or they can give up some of
their rents. If banks choose to raise salient prices to offset these losses,
they risk losing market share as customers ﬂee to cheaper competitors.
Empirically, the interventions studied above illustrate banks’
reluctance to adjust salient prices: There is no evidence that banks
recover CARD Act losses by across-the-board interest rate increases, nor is
there evidence that banks recover losses from the new overdraft regime.
That said, even if banks had offset their losses, these regulations would
still have been desirable. The existence of nonsalient prices means
consumers do not understand the true cost of consumer ﬁnancial products. A credit customer thinks they are paying a 0% APR but does not
appreciate that the 0% is only for the ﬁrst six months or that they will pay
$35 every time they are delinquent. If they knew about these hidden fees,
they would make a more educated product choice—perhaps they would
pick a card with a slightly higher introductory APR but lower
delinquency fees. Or perhaps they would choose to avoid credit cards
entirely. Any regulation that restricts banks’ ability to shroud prices will,
at the very least, help consumers make more informed decisions.
2. An Alternative to Direct Price Regulation Is a Shock to Consumer
Attention. — An alternative to reining in nonsalient pricing directly is to
make consumers aware of these exploitative pricing practices. Banks’
initial response to Durbin illustrates the impact of making fees salient on
both consumer and ﬁrm behavior. In the immediate aftermath of
Durbin, many large banks proposed a $5 monthly fee for customers who
use their debit cards as a form of purchase. This fee became a rallying cry
for the Occupy Wall Street movement—protesters burned Bank of
America debit cards,230 and an online petition against the fee garnered
more than 200,000 signatures.231 Lawmakers scorned the proposal, with
then-Vice President Joe Biden labelling it as “incredibly tone deaf”232 and
Senator Durbin urging consumers to “vote with their feet” and close
accounts at these institutions.233 Normally inattentive depositors heeded
needs both shrouding and imperfect competition. See Agarwal et al., Regulating
Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 114–15.
230. Bernard, supra note 89.
231. Ann Carrns, Petition on Debit Card Fee Attracts 200,000 Supporters, N.Y. Times:
Bucks (Oct. 13, 2011), https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/petition-on-debitcard-fee-attracts-200000-supporters/ [https://perma.cc/KXP7-FAWZ].
232. Amanda Terkel, Joe Biden on Bank of America: ‘At a Minimum, They Are
Incredibly Tone Deaf,’ HuffPost (Oct. 6, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10
/06/joe-biden-bank-america-tone-deaf_n_998055.html [https://perma.cc/2WNM-97Z7].
233. Press Release, Senator Dick Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate, Bank of America’s Outrageous New Fees (Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.durbin.
senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/bank-of-americas-outrageous-new-fees [https://perma.cc/
U82M-VVWD].
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the call: Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan reported that the
number of people closing accounts in the immediate aftermath of the
proposal jumped by more than 20% compared to the same period the
prior year.234 The proposed $5 fee became so unpopular that all of the
institutions chose to reverse it. Bank of America’s COO said the bank
“listened to [its] customers very closely” and decided against moving
forward with plans to charge this fee.235 While banks still offset Durbin
losses, the lesson of the failed $5 debit usage fee is clear: Raising the
salience of a price can incentivize consumers to make more informed
product choices.
The potential of such an approach is evident in the overdraft
domain. Some support paternalistic mandates banning overdraft protection. But such blanket bans decrease the set of options available to
consumers, some of whom may prefer the convenience of overdraft
protection despite its high costs.236 Rather than abandon a behavioral
nudge in favor of a prohibitive mandate, in the case of overdraft, there is
room for a salience shock that preserves consumer choice.
Bank of America implemented a version of a salience shock for
overdrafts from ATM transactions. Now, consumers can receive a
notiﬁcation when withdrawing cash, asking if they want to complete
transactions that will cause them to overdraft. 237 The beneﬁt of this
approach is that it alerts consumers to penalty fees immediately before
they are incurred, allowing them to weigh the beneﬁts of completing
their transactions against the high costs. Priming consumers through
salience shocks for overdrafts may decrease the frequency of overdraft
incidents.238
The same is possible for point-of-sale transactions. If a consumer is
buying a coffee and is about to overdraft, they could receive an alert
indicating that if they complete the purchase, they will be charged a fee.
The alert could also include a reminder that they can set up a lessexpensive overdraft line of credit through their bank that will still allow
them to complete the transaction. If the consumer is eager for caffeine
and has no other means of payment, they may elect to complete it and
234. Martha C. White, Bank of America’s $5 Debit Fee Led to More Account Closings,
CEO Says, Time (Jan. 23, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/01/23/bank-of-americas5-debit-fee-led-to-more-account-closings-ceo-says/ [https://perma.cc/H3PM-MGLZ].
235. Bernard, supra note 89.
236. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, supra note 215, at 215 (highlighting this possibility
in response to Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53).
237. Overdraft Services FAQs, Bank of Am., https://www.bankofamerica.com/
deposits/overdraft-services-faqs/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited July
25, 2019).
238. See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Limited and Varying Consumer Attention:
Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees, 27 Rev. Fin. Stud. 990, 990
(2014) (ﬁnding in an experimental setting that consumers who face overdraft-related
questions in surveys are less likely to incur these fees in the survey month, and consumers
that take multiple overdraft surveys reduce their overdrafts for up to two years).
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pay the overdraft fee. But making the fee salient should decrease
overdraft incidence for the 75% of overdrafters who claim they would
have preferred their transactions be declined to incurring high overdraft
fees.239
FIGURE 7: SAMPLE “SALIENCE SHOCK”240

It is important to distinguish this call for such a salience shock in the
context of overdraft (such as in Figure 7) from mandatory disclosures.
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider provide a scathing
indictment of mandatory disclosures, suggesting consumers suffer from
two main problems that render disclosures ineffective: (1) an overload
effect (namely, disclosures are too complex to be understood) and (2) an
accumulation problem (in other words, it is hard to remember a
disclosure when it competes in your memory with information about all
other disclosures—“memory is a sieve”).241 Additionally, many are skeptical of the usefulness of disclosures, noting that ﬁnancial institutions
generate rents by exploiting consumers’ tendency to underestimate the
239. Pew Ctr. on the States, supra note 192, at 5.
240. This Figure demonstrates a potential “salience shock” in the form of a text
message that Bank of America could send to its consumers during a point-of-sale
transaction in which they are about to overdraft.
241. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 686–90, 719 (2011).

2019]

MAKING CONSUMER FINANCE WORK

1565

likelihood they will make a late payment or overdraft. 242 Therefore,
overly optimistic consumers may opt in to overdraft protection (even if
the high fees are clearly disclosed) because, although they believe it is
unlikely they will ever use the service, they want protection in case of an
emergency. This is why recent changes to overdraft disclosure forms
proposed by the CFPB are unlikely to be effective.243 Disclosures—even
very clear ones—may prime consumers to the costs of overdrafting, but it
is unrealistic to expect most people to retain this information or accurately estimate their likelihood of ever bearing these fees.
Instead, a behavioral salience shock like alerting consumers to the
cost of an overdraft fee immediately before an overdraft incident has the
potential to be successful because it avoids the overload, accumulation,
and overoptimism problems. This immediate alert is a simple disclosure
that does not need to be recalled: closer in spirit to the sanitation grades
outside restaurants that Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider approve of
than complicated credit card contracts.244 Because relevant information
is presented to consumers immediately prior to an overdraft occurrence,
a salience shock also overcomes consumers’ overoptimism.245 It makes
the cost of overdraft salient when the overdraft incident is imminent,
instead of long before the incident, when consumers may naively believe
they will never make use of this service.
242. See Barr et al., supra note 38, at 50.
243. Professors Bubb and Pildes provide a vivid analogy for why they believe mandated
disclosures to be ineffective:
Given the structure of the self-control problem, solving it requires
forcing or enticing the consumer not to engage in a transaction that,
even with a clear-eyed understanding of the terms and risks, the
consumer in that moment wants to make. But while Odysseus could have
himself forcibly lashed to the mast, no easy way exists for consumers to
commit themselves not to open that store line of credit promising “no
payments and no interest for the next 12 months.” . . . After all,
Odysseus did not instruct his sailors to provide him with a “Total Cost of
Swimming with the Sirens” disclosure as soon as he got within earshot.
Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1649. While a fair critique of disclosure in general, this is
not an indictment of the proposed salience shock because, when made aware of the costs
of overdrafting, consumers will overwhelmingly choose not to complete a transaction
likely to incur a large fee. This is consistent with survey evidence suggesting that nearly all
consumers do not realize they have overdrafted. See Pew Ctr. on the States, supra note
191, at 4. In this setting, it’s more like Odysseus being tied to the mast when a simple alert
from his fellow sailors—there are sirens coming and if they lure you off this boat it won’t
end well—would have sufficed. For an example of an overdraft disclosure form reﬂecting
changes proposed by the CFPB, see Know Before You Owe: Current Model Form A-9,
CFPB, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201708_cfpb_A-9-form-ficus_overdraft
-model-forms-prototypes.pdf [https://perma.cc/34RC-Y327] (last visited on July 25, 2019).
244. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 241, at 743 (“For example, Los Angeles
County requires restaurants to disclose sanitation ‘grade cards’ on windows (letters ‘A,’ ‘B,’
or ‘C’), and these seem to have inﬂuenced consumers and, in turn, led to cleanlier
restaurants.”).
245. See id.
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In proposing this salience shock, I follow the Ben-Shahar and
Schneider suggestion that “brief, simple, and easy” disclosures work best
when they are part of a “larger program of social change. Sometimes the
purpose of mandates is not to give people information for making the
choice they prefer but rather to induce them to make the choice the
lawmaker deems preferable.” 246 This shock is meant to do precisely
that—strongly nudge consumers away from the $40 cup of coffee but
preserve their right to reject the nudge.
One reason to be conﬁdent about the efficacy of a salience shock in
the overdraft market is that it is already proven to work in practice. The
U.K. Financial Conduct Authority found that customers who receive text
alerts when their checking account balances fall close to zero reduce
overdraft incidents by 24%.247 As a result, all U.K. banking customers now
receive these notiﬁcations.248
The ability of increased salience to shape consumer choice is evident
across consumer ﬁnance markets: When consumers considering payday
loans learned how the loans’ ﬁnancing charges compared with the dollar
cost of borrowing similar sums on credit cards, the use of payday loans
fell by 11%.249 The same is true in the credit card market, where the
CARD Act’s requirement that issuers disclose the beneﬁts of early
repayment increases consumers’ prepayment signiﬁcantly, 250 and the
retail investing market, where consumers made aware of high mutual
fund fees reallocate investments.251
Salience shocks can thus be extended to consumer ﬁnance products
more generally. For example, for credit card, mortgage, or student loan
late fees, a notiﬁcation reminding a consumer to pay their bill immediately or incur a penalty would be more effective in discouraging
delinquency than ex ante disclosure of high penalty fees in these
contracts. Given many consumers’ limited attention spans, interventions

246. Id. at 744.
247. Competition & Mkts. Auth., supra note 44.
248. Rob Goodman, Red Alert: Banks Must Now Text You if You’re About to Slip into
Your Overdraft, Sun (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.thesun.co.uk/money/5484712/banksmust-now-text-you-if-youre-about-to-slip-into-your-overdraft/ [https://perma.cc/3QY2-PFPW].
249. See Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases,
and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. Fin. 1865, 1866–67 (2011) (ﬁnding that disclosing the
difference in charges between payday loans and credit cards in terms of dollar costs
reduced the take-up of future payday loans by 11% during the subsequent four months).
250. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at
114 (ﬁnding that making salient the beneﬁts of early repayment on monthly statements
increases the number of account holders who repay early).
251. See Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly
Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 605, 640–41 (2014)
(ﬁnding that with a fee instruction, test subjects paid average total fees that were
approximately 0.11% to 0.14% less than the control group and invested a higher
percentage of their portfolio in index funds than managed funds).

2019]

MAKING CONSUMER FINANCE WORK

1567

that make prices salient just prior to decisions that precipitate penalties
will limit costly consumer mistakes.
It is important to restrict these types of salience interventions and
dynamically assess when they are most necessary and most likely to be
effective. Shocking consumers along all the decisions they make with
notice of all of the possible fees is likely to run into Ben-Shahar and
Schneider’s “accumulation” problem: “[S]o many disclosures assail disclosees that they cannot possibly attend to more than a fraction of them.”252
As such, salience shocks should target fees and penalties that (1)
generate signiﬁcant proﬁts for large ﬁnancial institutions, and (2) seem
poorly understood by the consumers incurring them.253
Experimental evidence sheds light on when “salience shocks” help
guide consumers toward optimal behavior and when interventions are
less useful. Compare the success of the United Kingdom’s overdraft
shock in decreasing monthly overdraft charges by 24% to the failure of
an experiment in Mexico, in which visually showing consumers that their
debt burden was risky relative to peers had little impact on overall
indebtedness and even tended to increase indebtedness in some cases.254
Professor Ben-Shahar highlights this as proof that “smart disclosure” of
the kind advocated in this section—“timely-relevant compact
disclosure”—is unlikely to succeed.255
But Ben-Shahar’s skepticism is not warranted. Salience shocks can be
effective when they alert consumers to a cost that they can immediately
and easily avoid. In the overdraft setting, a consumer about to bear this
fee when purchasing their morning latte can simply pay with cash or
begin their morning without caffeine. When a consumer receives a
notice—even a clear, easy-to-understand notice—that they are likely to
default on their credit and that to reduce their risk they should
“maintain [their] debt well below [their] credit limit,” the shock is less
252. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 241, at 687.
253. For example, precrisis dependency on overdraft income and credit card back-end
fee income hinted at numerous salience problems. Further work should consider the
appropriate regulatory design, perhaps developing a model for consumer ﬁnance
analogous to the work of Professor Robin Greenwood (and coauthors) in the
macroprudential risk arena. See generally Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Jeremy
C. Stein & Adi Sunderam, Strengthening and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation,
Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2017, at 479, 525 (proposing a dynamic stress test
by each year rounding up the “most highly compensated line managers or traders” and
then “stress testing the exposures most closely associated with these employees”). Id. at
525.
254. See Enrique Seira, Alan Elizondo & Eduardo Laguna-Müggenburg, Are
Information Disclosures Effective? Evidence from the Credit Card Market, 9 Am. Econ. J.
277, 279 (2017); Competition & Mkts. Auth., supra note 44.
255. Omri Ben-Shahar, More Failed Nudges: Evidence of Ineffective “Behaviorally
Informed” Disclosures, Contracts Jotwell (Aug. 10, 2017), https://contracts.jotwell.com/
more-failed-nudges-evidence-of-ineffective-behaviorally-informed-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc
/4LR5-9XPR].
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effective because the action demanded of them is more ambiguous.256
Shocks that highlight for consumers immediate costs and simple, easy
ways to avoid them are more likely to shape behavior meaningfully.
B.

Regulators Should Address Inequitable Cross-Subsidies

Each of the three interventions studied in this Article feature crosssubsidization of wealthy consumers by their low-income counterparts.257
The fact that poorer consumers tend to pay higher prices for consumer
ﬁnancial products justiﬁes regulation.
This inequitable cross-subsidization clearly exists in markets with
salience problems for two distinct reasons. First, low-income consumers
are more prone to behavioral limitations that ﬁnancial ﬁrms exploit.
They are less attentive (less likely to read complex credit contracts) and
more naive (more likely to underestimate the chances that they will pay
penalty fees).258 Second, these consumers are less ﬁnancially stable: They
make less money and, as a result, have fewer funds in their bank
accounts, increasing the likelihood of overdrafting. Similarly, they have

256. See Seira et al., supra note 254, at 279–80, 288 (ﬁnding that “‘high risk’
messag[ing] . . . decreas[ed] delinquency, with an effect of 8.2 percent of mean
delinquency”).
257. Here, cross-subsidization refers to consumers paying different prices for the same
good or service. There is a possibility that what is labeled as "inequitable crosssubsidization" may be understood as price discrimination that occurs in response to the
differences in the costs of serving different types of consumers. While this is a conceivable
explanation of price patterns in the overdraft and credit card markets, proponents of this
argument have difficulty explaining why it is the case that the most behaviorally limited
consumers are the most expensive for the bank to service. In the interchange market, the
cross-subsidization of rewards card users by their non-rewards-card counterparts is difficult
to justify with any cost story. Additionally, intervention would still be justiﬁed, since a
market failure arises from the inability of competitor card networks to compete with
incumbents. See Pete Lukacs, Leslie Neubecker & Philip Rowan, Fin. Conduct Auth.,
Occasional Paper No. 22, Price Discrimination and Cross-Subsidy in Financial Services 7–8
(2016) (distinguishing cross-subsidies from price discrimination).
258. See, e.g., Nadia Massoud, Anthony Saunders & Barry Scholnick, The Impact of
Wealth on Financial Mistakes: Evidence from Credit Card Nonpayment, 9 J. Fin. Stability
26, 28 (2013) (ﬁnding that individuals who make avoidable credit card mistakes—for
example, incurring credit card penalty fees despite having sufficient funds in their deposit
accounts—tend to be poorer). These authors point out that there is a difference between
individuals who deliberately go delinquent on credit card payments in spite of having
sufficient funds available and those who go delinquent because they do not have sufficient
funds and are facing ﬁnancial difficulties. Id. Although we expect the latter to primarily be
lower-income consumers, it is not obvious ex ante that the former—those who make
mistakes like forgetting to mail checks on time or miscalculating their account balances
and overdrawing—will be. Wealthier consumers may simply not care about the cost of
incurring relatively minor fees. However, empirical evidence shows that poorer consumers
are much more likely to pay avoidable penalty fees. These results are consistent with
behavioral models that the poor are less ﬁnancially sophisticated, and hold true even after
accounting for differences in educational attainment. Id. at 35.
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less disposable income and thus less money available to repay bills in a
timely manner.
Note, however, that these are generalizations: Certainly, some lowincome consumers closely read every ﬁnancial contract, and some highincome consumers have lavish spending habits and limited savings. However, as a general rule, low-income customers disproportionately bear
shrouded bank fees: An FDIC study estimates that about 20% of consumers with a median household income of $70,000 or more regularly overdraft, whereas about 40% of consumers living in low-income areas with a
median annual income of less than $30,000 per year overdraw their accounts and bear penalty fees.259 Similarly, although nearly 70% of customers below the poverty line are in credit card debt (and thus capable of
incurring penalty fees), this share is closer to 40% for consumers who
make more than $100,000.260 Additionally, the wealthy tend to have access to cheaper ﬁnancial products: checking accounts with no monthly
fees261 and credit cards with attractive rewards and low interest rates.
These products are often offered at below-cost prices: Consider a $0
checking account. Providing a checking account is costly to the bank. For
example, the bank needs to build a national ATM network, hire tellers to
process transactions, monitor potential fraud in the account, and develop online banking technology. And yet, prior to Durbin, banks offered
this product for free. They could afford to do this because fee income
generated primarily from low-income consumers, such as overdraft revenue, helped cover the cost of providing these services.262
Regulating nonsalient prices will help the low income because it will
decrease this cross-subsidization. But it can also help the wealthy.
Avoiding nonsalient fees is time-consuming. Imagine your friend Penny is
both sophisticated and highly cost sensitive. If there is a penny to be
saved, she will expend tremendous effort to save it. To avoid potentially
overdrafting, she either calls her bank to check her account balance
before making every purchase or pays with cash. She continuously signs
up for new credit cards to take advantage of 0% APR offers, carefully records when these rates expire, and closes the accounts before the
introductory period ends. She sets alarms on her phone and leaves notes
on her refrigerator reminding her of deadlines for credit card payments,
lest she delay by a single day. Avoiding shrouded fees is utility enhancing
for Penny—she pays less for ﬁnancial services than her less careful
counterparts. However, from a societal perspective, this behavior is

259. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at v.
260. Draut & Silva, supra note 146, at 10.
261. Prior to Durbin, most consumers had free checking accounts; post-Durbin, only
the rich, with sufficiently large account balances, have free checking accounts. See
Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 5, 35.
262. Willis, supra note 55, at 1177 (highlighting how banks explicitly subsidize the cost
of their free checking services with revenue from intentionally steep overdraft fees).
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inefficient.263 Even consumers who beneﬁt from cross-subsidization are
inefficiently expending energy to preserve these beneﬁts. More up-front
pricing of consumer products would reduce these inefficiencies.
Importantly, inequitable cross-subsidization is also commonplace in
markets that do not feature price shrouding. Even in the absence of
salience problems, regulators should intervene to address regressive
transfers. For example, many who study the interchange market
highlight its unfairness: Low-income consumers pay higher prices for
retail goods than the wealthy.264 When consumers pay in cash, merchants
pay nothing to process these transactions. Cash-paying consumers tend
to be the poorest—those without access to debit or credit instruments.265
When consumers pay with debit cards, merchants pay relatively low interchange fees. Debit-paying consumers are slightly better off than those
who use cash, but still relatively low income, without access to credit.266
Credit usage is most pronounced among the wealthy.267 When consumers
pay with rewards cards, merchants pay exorbitant interchange fees, often
upwards of 4% of the value of the transaction. Some of that 4% goes to
the card networks, which proﬁt from interchange. But some of it also
goes to wealthy consumers: A customer who uses a rewards card to buy a
new pair of $100 sneakers gets 1.5% cash back, paying only $98.50 for
their new Nikes. A customer who uses cash to make that same purchase

263. See, e.g., Chavie Lieber, The Credit Card Obsessives Who Game the System—And
Share Secrets Online, Racked (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.racked.com/2015/4/1/
8320731/credit-card-points-miles [https://perma.cc/K5JR-DAHK] (“For most of us, this is
a full-time obsession—I literally work 16 hours a day, seven days a week. It requires a lot of
organization and spreadsheets.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ben
Schlappig, operator of credit card rewards blog One Mile at a Time)).
264. Aaron Klein, America’s Poor Subsidize Wealthier Consumers in a Vicious Income
Inequality Cycle, NBC News: Think (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/
opinion/america-s-poor-subsidize-wealthier-consumers-vicious-income-inequality-cyclencna845091 [https://perma.cc/5FL5-W7KW] (discussing how credit card users, especially
those with more money in the account and thus more money to use, ultimately pay less by
getting back some of what they have paid in the forms of cash back, reward points, or
frequent-ﬂyer miles).
265. Raynil Kumar, Tayeba Maktabi & Shaun O’Brien, 2018 Findings from the Diary of
Consumer Payment Choice 9 (2018), https://www.frbsf.org/cash/ﬁles/federal-reservecpo-2018-diary-of-consumer-payment-choice-110118.pdf [https://perma.cc/ LP23-E4QX]
(“For individuals in households that earn $50,000 or less, cash is the most common form
of payment, followed by debit. As income rises, credit and debit replace cash as the most
commonly used payment instrument.”).
266. See id. (ﬁnding that for households with less than $25,000 in annual income, the
most common means of purchase is cash; for households who make between $50,000 and
$75,000, debit; and for households that make more than $125,000, credit).
267. See id. at 10 (noting that “[a]t incomes above $100,000, households use credit
cards to pay for the largest number of transactions”—33% of their total. In contrast, those
with incomes below $25,000 disproportionately use cash—for nearly 50% of their
transactions—and use credit cards only 7% of the time).
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pays the full $100.268 These dollar values may seem minute, but they
accumulate quickly: On average, card-using households receive over
$1,100 from cash users every year.269 Rewards are subsidized by higher
retail prices for low-income consumers.
One way to decrease the incidence of regressive transfers is to ban
loyalty rewards programs. Economists estimate that eliminating credit
rewards would increase consumer welfare. 270 The intuition is simple:
Banks generate high interchange revenue by offering attractive rewards
programs to card-using consumers. If these rewards programs disappear,
consumers will have no incentive to transact with payment instruments
that are especially expensive to merchants. Less frequent use of these
cards will lower merchant costs. As the conceptual framework offered in
the Appendix illustrates, lower merchant costs will lead to lower retail
prices. These savings will accrue most signiﬁcantly to the low income,
eliminating the “reverse-Robin-Hood problem” of the current payment
regime.271
As with regulations to rein in price shrouding, eliminating this crosssubsidy clearly helps the low income, decreasing the prices they bear. But
it helps consumers more broadly as well. Many are point-chasing fanatics,
maintaining several credit cards and expending both mental energy and
time to determine which card to use for groceries, which offers the highest cash-back rewards, and when to close accounts before teaser offers
expire.272 This may be utility enhancing for individuals who derive pleasure from maximizing rewards; however, it is hard to view this intensity of
search as socially desirable.273
268. See Schuh et al., supra note 48, at 1 (“[M]erchants mark up their retail prices for
all consumers by enough to recoup the merchant fees from credit card sales. This retail
price markup for all consumers results in credit-card-paying consumers being subsidized
by consumers who do not pay with credit cards . . . .”).
269. Id. at 3.
270. See, e.g., id. at 3–4.
271. See, e.g., Steven Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis:
Do Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 Rutgers L.J. 419, 420
(2009) (“Robin Hood . . . robbed from the rich and gave to the poor. . . . [E]conomists
have postulated that credit card companies do the opposite—forcing low-income cash
customers to pay higher prices for retail goods that effectively fund . . . rewards that go
predominantly to affluent cardholders.”).
272. See, e.g., Rob Copeland, If You Have 29 Credit Cards, You’re Probably a
Millennial, Wall St. J. (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-you-have-29-creditcards-youre-probably-a-millennial-1490972634 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(detailing how “[f]anatics sign up for new cards in every city they visit,” obtain “multiple
versions of the same card,” and “angle to use their cards to cover tabs at restaurants”).
One tale of point-chasing obsession stands out: A customer, so disappointed about being
rejected for a Chase Sapphire Reserve, constructed a costume of the card out of cardboard
and sent the bank a photo, hoping for reconsideration. See id.
273. See Lieber, supra note 263 (“‘[A] large part of the [point-chasing] community
doesn’t actually like to travel, but they love gaming the system.’ ‘It’s like extreme
couponing: Those people get, like, 10,000 diapers for free even though they don’t have
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Banning credit card rewards is unlikely to be a popular regulatory
approach. A less aggressive alternative to eliminate cross-subsidization is
to allow retailers to price discriminate. Inequities in this market arise
from the fact that retail prices are uniform. It can cost merchants $4 to
process a $100 credit card transaction, but there are legal and contractual barriers that prohibit merchants from surcharging credit card
consumers to cover those $4 of interchange expense.274 If merchants
could pass through these processing fees to card users alone, the result
would be lower retail prices for the cash-paying, low-income consumers.
And card users could decide whether the beneﬁts of card usage—for example, the cash back, the airline miles—were worth paying an extra $4.
An even milder approach is to allow merchants to encourage
consumers to use cheaper forms of payment. Card networks ban
merchants from directly signaling to consumers that rewards cards have
higher processing fees than other cards. These “antisteering provisions”
make it impossible for retailers to nudge consumers toward cards with
lower interchange expense.275 Allowing merchants to suggest consumers
use cheaper payment alternatives will decrease inequitable cross-subsidies
by reducing the incidence of transactions with rewards cards. Eliminating
antisteering restrictions would also encourage the emergence of credit
cards with lower interchange fees: Because merchants will be able to
push consumers to use cheaper cards, there will be greater incentive for
card networks to compete to be the card most recommended by retailers.
1. Regulators Should Use Consumer Protection Authority to Tackle
Inequitable Cross-Subsidization. — Through a series of recent antitrust
cases, merchants sought to implement some of the policies proposed in
this Article: allowing retail price discrimination through surcharging
consumers who use expensive payment instruments 276 and removing

kids. In this case, some people care about screwing the airline,’ . . . .” (quoting members of
the credit-card blogging community)).
274. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518 (McKinney 2019) (prohibiting merchant
surcharges on credit card users); Tex. Bus. & Com. § 604A.0021 (2019) (same); see also
Credit or Debit Card Surcharges Statutes, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Oct. 13,
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/credit-or-debit-card
-surcharges-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/6N47-BJJ6] (tallying similar state statutes and
noting that eleven states and Puerto Rico have banned merchant credit card surcharges).
275. See infra section II.B.1.
276. See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017)
(holding that no-surcharge statutes, which bar merchants from charging consumers
higher prices for credit card usage, implicate First Amendment concerns); see also Bruce
D. Sokler, Robert G. Kidwell & Farrah Short, What Have Merchants Gained from Payment
Card Antitrust Litigation?, Mintz (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.mintz.com/insightscenter/viewpoints/2301/2016-08-what-have-merchants-gained-payment-card-antitrust
[https://perma.cc/FVL4-PEPJ] (detailing the history of payment card antitrust litigation
and its effects on merchants). Interestingly, in some cases merchants are allowed to offer
cash discounts and discounts for debit (versus credit) usage, although these rules vary by
state and even by merchant. Id.
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antisteering prohibitions.277 The antitrust argument is that these practices help too-big-to-fail institutions engage in anticompetitive exercises
of market power, creating barriers to entry for new competitors, facilitating collusion to generate supracompetitive proﬁts.
Historically, antitrust has been a powerful tool to rein in card
network behavior.278 In the mid-1990s, Visa’s and MasterCard’s “exclusivity rules,” which prohibited member banks from issuing cards from
emerging competitors (Discover and American Express), were found to
reduce competition unfairly.279 And after extensive litigation, card networks agreed to make changes to “Honor All Cards” rules, which
required merchants to accept all networks’ cards (even high-cost rewards) if they wanted to accept any of them,280 and card networks agreed
to pay billions in damages for price-ﬁxing.281
However, recent trends in antitrust—directly related to interchange—give rise to questions about the viability of continued reliance
on judicial enforcement in this setting.282 In Ohio v. American Express,
believed by some to be the “most signiﬁcant antitrust opinion by the
Court in more than a decade,”283 the Supreme Court held that American
Express’s antisteering terms—which prohibit merchants from encouraging consumers to use credit cards with lower interchange fees—are not
anticompetitive.284 The Court’s basic argument was that because the interchange market is two-sided (card networks depend on simultaneously
277. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2289 (2018) (ﬁnding that
although antisteering provisions may restrict card networks’ incentives to decrease
merchant interchange rates, determination of whether these provisions are
anticompetitive requires consideration of countervailing beneﬁts that accrue to consumers
from using rewards cards).
278. See generally K. Craig Wildfang & Ryan W. Marth, The Persistence of Antitrust
Controversy and Litigation in Credit Card Networks, 73 Antitrust L.J. 675 (explaining the
history of antitrust litigation against credit card networks).
279. See id. at 684.
280. Although “Honor All Cards” lawsuits for debit versus credit cards resulted in
settlement, merchant suits to decouple rewards credit acceptance from nonpremium
credit card acceptance remain live, and a new set of litigation is likely to emerge around
“Honor All Devices” terms, whereby merchants that accept payment instruments housed
in one digital wallet have to accept all digital wallets, regardless of the costs associated. See
Adam Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: Digital Wallets and the Honor All Devices Rule 30
(2016), http://www.creditslips.org/files/pandoras-digital-box.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WB23-R898].
281. In fact, a recent class action suit alleging collusive pricing practices was settled but
then invalidated, largely because it restricted merchants’ future ability to bring such suits.
AnnaMaria Andriotis, Visa, Mastercard Near Settlement over Card-Swipe Fees, Wall St. J.
(June 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/visa-mastercard-near-settlement-over-cardswipe-fees-1530193694 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
282. See Lina Khan, The Supreme Court Just Quietly Gutted Antitrust Law, Vox (July
3, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/7/3/17530320/antitrust-americanexpress-amazon-uber-tech-monopoly-monopsony [https://perma.cc/UWV4-FS5Z].
283. Id.
284. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2278 (2018).
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marketing their product to merchants to accept their cards and to
consumers to use them), proof of anticompetitive harm must consider
both sides of this market. 285 Thus, although one side of the market
(merchants) may be harmed by antisteering provisions, this harm must
be weighed against countervailing beneﬁts that accrue to consumers who
use these cards and get attractive rewards.286
Many antitrust experts point out ﬂaws in this reasoning 287 and
believe that the Court erred by ignoring clear impediments to
competition that eliminate the incentive for card networks to compete to
offer lower merchant interchange rates.288 This is a reasonable critique.
However, independent of any concerns about monopoly pricing, the
existence of inequitable cross-subsidies in the interchange market, and
more broadly in most ﬁnancial markets, justiﬁes intervention on
consumer protection grounds because it is unfair that low-income
consumers pay higher prices than their wealthy counterparts.
Speciﬁcally, Section 5531 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act
of 2010 provides the CFPB with broad authority to intervene to prohibit
“unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]” (collectively,
“UDAAPs”).289 Practices may be unfair, deceptive, and abusive—but each
prohibition is governed by distinct standards:290 Roughly, unfair acts are
those likely to cause substantial injury, cannot be reasonably avoided, and
lack countervailing beneﬁts;291 deceptive acts are those likely to mislead
consumers;292 and abusive practices are those that materially interfere
with a consumer’s ability “to understand a term or condition of a
consumer ﬁnancial product or service,” or that take unreasonable

285. See id. at 2286.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Pallavi Guniganti, Amex Ruling Is an “Economic Nightmare,”
Hovenkamp Says, Global Competition Rev. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://globalcompetitionreview.com
/article/usa/1173902/amex-ruling-is-an-%E2%80%9Ceconomic-nightmare%E2%80%9Dhovenkamp-says (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
288. The District Court in Ohio v. American Express Co. found, and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s dissenters agreed, that antisteering discourages card network competition. 138 S.
Ct. at 2293–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Because the provisions eliminated any advantage
that lower prices might produce, Discover ‘abandoned its low-price business model’ and
raised its merchant fees to match those of its competitors.”).
289. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012).
290. Id. Although the “abusive” standard has rarely been used as providing standalone
authority, it has frequently been used to justify intervention to prevent practices that are
also “deceptive” or “unfair.” See Adam Levitin, CFPB “Abusive” Rulemaking?, Credit Slips
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/10/cfpb-abusive-rulemaking.html
[https://perma.cc/3QZJ-D8XX] (indicating that out of the 206 enforcement actions to
date, the CFPB has brought “abusive” claims in only 27 cases, and in all but one the
allegations alleged to be abusive were also alleged to be either unfair or deceptive).
291. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (deﬁning unfair practices).
292. See CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 2016) (deﬁning deceptive
practices).
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advantage of a consumer’s lack of understanding of the risks, costs, or
conditions of consumer ﬁnance products or services.293
Financial institution practices that create cross-subsidies, like
antisteering provisions and prohibitions on merchant surcharging, are
likely UDAAPs because they are unfair to low-income consumers: These
consumers pay more for goods because they do not receive rewards
kickbacks. In many cases, these consumers cannot reasonably act to avoid
injury because they do not have access to premium rewards cards. Although there are countervailing beneﬁts from loyalty rewards, crucially,
these do not accrue to the same class of customers who suffer harm.294
Although the CFPB has yet to assert its UDAAP power in this setting, it
likely has the authority to target payment products for the cross-subsidies
they create.
Importantly, UDAAP power—unlike antitrust authority—does not
require that consumer advocates demonstrate proof of anticompetitive
harm to justify intervention. Thus, this Article hopes to push policymakers away from a singular focus on market concentration, which
creates unnecessary hurdles that, in the current judicial climate, may be
insurmountable.295 It is true that the ﬁnancial sector is concentrated and
becoming increasingly more so: The ﬁve largest banks hold more than
40% of the domestic deposits in the United States.296 This has prompted
calls by policymakers and academics to “break up the banks.”297 Card
networks are even more concentrated—Visa and Mastercard control
more than 70% of the payment card market. 298 It is plausible, and
perhaps even likely, that the markets studied here feature large ﬁnancial
institutions using their market power to generate supracompetitive
proﬁts.299 However, even abstracting away from market power concerns,
regulators can—and should—intervene in these markets on consumer
protection grounds. The fact that wealthy consumers pay lower prices

293. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (deﬁning abusive practices).
294. See supra section II.B.
295. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 282 (suggesting that the Court’s decision in Ohio v.
American Express makes it harder to enforce antitrust laws and consequently makes it easier
for dominant ﬁrms “to abuse their market power with impunity”).
296. Treﬁs Team & Great Speculations, The Five Largest U.S. Banks Hold More than
40% of All Deposits, Forbes (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/
2017/12/14/the-ﬁve-largest-u-s-banks-hold-more-than-40-of-all-deposits [https://perma.cc/
VAH5-99RZ] [hereinafter Treﬁs Team & Great Speculations, Five Largest Banks].
297. See, e.g., Sylvan Lane, Bernie Sanders Introduces Bill to Break Up Big Banks, Hill
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/ﬁnance/409785-bernie-sanders-introduces-billto-break-up-big-banks [https://perma.cc/68NJ-2VMR].
298. Treﬁs Team & Great Speculations, AmEx Is Likely to Become the Second Largest
U.S. Card Processing Company This Year, Forbes (May 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/greatspeculations/2018/05/29/amex-is-likely-to-become-the-second-largest-u-scard-processing-company-this-year/#3ffdf76a4fa0 [https://perma.cc/HV6W-NTCR].
299. In other words, proﬁts above what could be sustained in a competitive market.
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than their low-income counterparts justiﬁes regulation. The focus on
market power is thus unnecessarily limiting.
One important caveat is that although regulators can and should
intervene in these markets, not all interventions will necessarily be beneﬁcial. Durbin provides a powerful example of how ill-designed regulation
can exacerbate the problems it seeks to correct. The interchange market
features an inequitable cross-subsidy: Low-income consumers pay more
for retail goods than their wealthier, rewards-earning counterparts.
Rather than help these consumers, Durbin harmed them. As a result of
the cap on debit interchange fees, bank fees doubled.300 These increases
are borne entirely by low-income consumers, because fees are waived for
wealthy consumers with sufficiently high account balances.301
Unlike Durbin, well-designed interchange regulation should focus
on credit interchange. The success of this approach is elucidated by
predecessor legislation in Australia, where the cap on credit card interchange fees decreased the beneﬁts to banks from credit usage: Consequently, banks lowered credit card rewards, thereby decreasing crosssubsidization of the wealthy by their low-income counterparts.302
Unfortunately, the Durbin Amendment did not follow the Australian
example. Instead, this legislation capped debit interchange fees, leaving
credit interchange fees unchecked. Rather than reduce credit card
rewards, banks were incentivized to offer even more generous rewards
programs to encourage consumers to use credit, for which interchange
rates remain unregulated. 303 For consumers without access to credit
cards, this has widened the gap between the prices they pay and the
prices the wealthy pay for retail goods. For the ﬁnancially fragile with
access to credit, the nudge toward credit has led to higher indebtedness,
trapping these consumers in expensive cycles of debt. Overall, Durbin
has harmed consumers—especially the low income—increasing the
300. Zywicki et al., supra note 217, at 8 ﬁg.4 (displaying an increase in average bank
account monthly maintenance fees from around $6 in 2009 to over $12 in 2013).
301. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 35 (ﬁnding that more
than 70% of consumers in the lowest income quintile pay account fees post-Durbin,
compared to only 5% of those in the highest quintile).
302. See Review of the Reserve Bank and Payments System Board Annual Reports
2005: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Econ., Fin., & Pub. Admin. 5 (2006) (Austl.)
(testimony of Philip W. Lowe, Assistant Governor, Financial System Group, Reserve Bank
of Australia), https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/hansard/reps/commttee/r9267.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BWH8-7JKP] (noting in reference to the impact of the Australian credit
interchange cap that “[t]he value of reward points has been cut, some merchants have
introduced surcharges, and annual fees have been increased . . . [and] [o]n average, the
value of reward points on those cards that offer points has fallen”).
303. See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Did Durbin Amendment Lead to Unintended Credit Card
Splurge?, Am. Banker (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/diddurbin-amendment-lead-to-unintended-credit-card-splurge (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that fees collected from credit cards were almost twice as much as
compared to debit card transactions after the amendment).
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inequitable cross-subsidies that well-designed intervention in this market
should address.
2. Regulation that Helps Low-Income Consumers—Even if at the Expense of
Their Wealthy Counterparts—Is Desirable. — When policymakers debate
regulation, they often discuss consumers as a group. Calling for a
Consumer Product Safety Commission, then-Professor Warren described
the inequities of a market with proﬁt-hungry banks on one side and naive
consumers on another. The issue with these markets, she argued, was that
prior to the crisis regulators would “focus intently on bank proﬁtability
and far less on the ﬁnancial impact on customers of many of the products
the banks sell.”304
This was certainly true of the precrisis regulatory regime. However,
this view misses the important nuance that consumers are
heterogeneous. It is overly simplistic to think of these markets as
featuring bad actors (banks) exploiting naive actors (consumers). It is
still simplistic (though less so) to think of these markets as they are
described in this Article—as featuring banks, sophisticated consumers,
and unsophisticated consumers. Sophistication and income status tend
to be closely related: Higher income consumers tend to be more sophisticated and have more money in their bank accounts. Practically, this
means that the high penalty fees that low-income customers are likely to
pay subsidize banks offering cheaper ﬁnancial products to those who are
wealthier.305
There are reasons to believe that reducing this inequitable crosssubsidization can be Pareto improving—said another way, that it is
possible to decrease the prices that poor consumers pay for ﬁnancial
products without making the wealthy worse off. As illustrated in the
Appendix, this can result if banks charge supracompetitive prices to
generate excessive rents.306 Imagine a large sneaky bank. Sneaky Bank
rips off customers by charging high prices: For a checking account that
costs $100 to provide, Sneaky Bank charges $105. It also charges consumers that overdraft an extra $200. This means unsophisticated consumers
pay $305 for their checking accounts; and sophisticated consumers pay
$105. Now imagine that regulators cap overdraft fees at $0. Sneaky Bank
is making much less revenue from unsophisticated consumers. But if
Sneaky Bank raises baseline checking account prices to cover these
losses, then it may lose customers. Faced with this possibility, banks like
Sneaky Bank may choose not to offset losses from regulation of nonsalient prices. This explains why banks do not raise salient prices in
response to CARD Act and overdraft losses.
304. Warren, supra note 228 (emphasis added).
305. See Willis, supra note 55, at 1178 (pointing out that because overdraft fees
“effectively subsidize all checking accounts, the effect is that the poorest account holders
pay the costs of all accounts”).
306. See infra Appendix.
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What if instead Sneaky Bank was less sneaky: It charged $100 for
checking accounts, which cost them exactly $100 to provide. But then a
competitor realized that it could offer free checking (a $0 bank account)
and cover costs by charging $200 in overdraft fees to only unsophisticated consumers. Sneaky Bank would have been forced to change its
pricing to mimic this competitor, otherwise it would have lost all its
customers. This means that sophisticated consumers who avoid overdraft
fees end up with cheaper bank accounts even though banks do not
necessarily generate rents from pricing in this manner. If a regulator caps
overdraft fees at $0, Sneaky Bank will be forced to raise checking account
prices to cover costs. In this example, sophisticated consumers would be
harmed, because their checking account costs increase from $0 to $100.
This intervention would not increase overall consumer welfare. However,
it would increase welfare for unsophisticated consumers, who were being
disadvantaged by shrouded pricing. This is a progressive reform that
would create more equitable ﬁnancial markets.
The stylized Sneaky Bank examples are meant to illustrate a simple
point: No matter the market dynamics at play—whether oligopoly with
banks making excessive proﬁts, or perfect competition with zero bank
proﬁts, or some middle ground—regulation to tackle cross-subsidization
is desirable.307 The relevant metric for policymakers should not be whether intervention increases consumer welfare overall but rather whether it
creates a more equitable ﬁnancial system. Practically, the interventions
this Article advocates for in the interchange market (like decreasing
loyalty rewards or allowing merchants to surcharge wealthy customers
who use cards with higher interchange fees) may not beneﬁt every group
of consumers. The wealthy, who currently pay low retail prices because of
rewards kickbacks, may see their prices rise. That is a feature of welldesigned regulation, not a bug. Regulation should put a weight on the
scale in favor of those disadvantaged in consumer markets. While this can
mean tilting the scales in favor of naive consumers and away from sophisticated banks, it can also mean tilting the scales in favor of naive
consumers and away from more sophisticated consumers.
C.

Watch What Firms Do, Not What They Say

This Article illustrates the dangers of judging the desirability of regulation based on how banks say they will respond to intervention. As
proﬁt-maximizing institutions, these ﬁrms have every incentive to prevent
regulators from curbing their behavior. To discourage costly regulation,
307. It is worth noting that many prominent law and economics scholars are skeptical
of legal rules to accomplish such redistribution and instead prefer redistribution through
progressive income taxation. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal
System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud.
667, 674–75 (1994). While not the subject of this Article, future research should consider
whether more progressive taxes can right the inequities in consumer ﬁnance markets
more efficiently than direct intervention.
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every time policymakers propose a change, banks argue that the result
will be higher consumer costs and less access to desirable ﬁnancial
products.308 However, the empirical evidence in this Article suggests that
ﬁnancial institutions’ assertions about how interventions will harm consumers are often overstated. 309 Analyzing regulatory efficacy requires
thorough data-driven analysis of what banks actually do in consumer
ﬁnance markets, not simply trusting banks’ assertions that losses will be
passed through to consumers.
In commenting on the CARD Act, large card issuers argued that
consumers, not banks, would bear the costs of restrictions on penalty fee
revenue and unanticipated interest rate hikes.310 Financial institutions
noted that before the CARD Act, the ability to freely adjust credit card
prices allowed card issuers to price-discriminate between risky customers,
to whom the provision of credit is expensive, and stable customers, to
whom the provision of credit is less costly.311 Because the CARD Act
restricts penalty fees and interest rate changes, card companies said they
would lose this potential for price discrimination and all consumers’
prices would increase to cover the likely defaults of the riskiest
borrowers.312 Even academics who supported regulating credit card penalty fees took heed of banks’ caution and warned that “the reduced
revenue stream to lenders from these fees would mean that other rates
and fees would be adjusted to compensate.”313
Early reports of the CARD Act suggested that banks adjusted in the
manner they said they would, and that the intervention increased the
cost of borrowing across the board for borrowers of all risk types. Popular
press articles suggested that the CARD Act increased interest rates for
consumers, 314 and Federal Reserve commentators postulated that the

308. See, e.g., Who Pays for Bank Regulation?, Goldman Sachs (June 2014),
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/public-policy/regulatory-reform/who-pays-forbank-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/X9XH-QZG9] (“[L]ow-income consumers and
small businesses . . . have paid the largest price for increased bank regulation.”).
309. See supra sections I.A.3, I.B.3 & I.C.3.
310. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Credit Card Market, supra note 175
(“The cost of credit is higher [for consumers] than it would be in the absence of the
CARD Act.”).
311. See, e.g., id. at 11 (noting that the CARD Act has limited card issuers’ ability to
adjust interest rates based on consumers’ payment behavior).
312. See, e.g., Visa Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Nov. 22, 2013), http://
d1lge852tjjqow.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001403161/de11876c-2110-47d2-9026-367deae048e9.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BVC4-BB6V] (stating that the CARD Act “could increase the costs
of card issuance or decrease the ﬂexibility of issuers to charge market-based interest rates
and fees on credit card accounts”).
313. See Barr et al., supra note 38, at 50.
314. See, e.g., Curtis Arnold & MoneyBuilder, CARD Act May Have Cost Consumers
Billions, Forbes (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2012/02/
21/card-act-may-have-cost-consumers-billions/#2b6ae9a75bbb [https://perma.cc/6HC5-HUT8]
(“Based on roughly $800 billion in outstanding U.S. credit card debt over much of the
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CARD Act may have led to closures of now-unproﬁtable consumer
accounts315 and lower credit limits for customers.316 The ﬁnancial sector
suggested that the CARD Act increased interest rates by more than 72
basis points, pointing out that “[w]hile the CARD Act has provided clear
and signiﬁcant beneﬁts to consumers, there have also been signiﬁcant
tradeoffs, speciﬁcally, higher costs and less availability for credit card
credit.”317
However, these early analyses conﬂated the impact of the CARD Act
with general economic conditions. The period surrounding its enactment coincided with the worst economic downturn since the Great
Depression. 318 This makes drawing causal inferences challenging: Do
banks close credit card accounts and decrease credit limits because of the
CARD Act, or because aggregate consumption—and thus demand for
credit—dropped off because of the Recession?319
Thorough empirical work on the CARD Act is able to disentangle
the impact of the legislation from the impact of the decrease in credit demand that has followed from the Recession and comes to a much more
positive outlook on its efficacy. Working with a unique panel dataset from
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, economists compared
consumer credit card accounts, which were impacted by the CARD Act,
to small business accounts, which were left unregulated.320 Because both
consumers and small businesses were impacted by the Recession, this
approach was able to isolate the impact of the CARD Act. The economists found that although fees on consumer credit cards decreased substantially following the CARD Act, there has been no offsetting increase

past two years, this 2.1-percent increase in credit card rates would translate to an annual
additional consumer cost of $16.8 billion.”).
315. See, e.g., Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 19, at 10 (“[V]oluntary or involuntary
closures may be related to the reforms.”).
316. See, e.g., Larry Santucci, A Tale of Two Vintages: Credit Limit Management
Before and After the CARD Act and Great Recession 14 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.
Payment Cards Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 15-01, 2015), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract
=2646080 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that the CARD Act may have
contributed to “lower credit limits for high credit-quality consumers”).
317. Comment Letter from Nessa Eileen Feddis, Am. Bankers Ass’n, to Monica
Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, CFPB (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.aba.com/archive/
Comment_Letter_Archive/Comment%20Letter%20Archive/clCardAct2013Feb.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AJ75-KSS6].
318. See generally IMF, World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery (2009),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2016/12/31/World-Economic-Outlook
-April-2009-Crisis-and-Recovery-22575 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
the impact and projections of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis).
319. See Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 19, at 1 (stating that it is difficult to
determine whether the main cause of account closures “was the economic downturn or
preemptive action in anticipation of the new legislation”).
320. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at
113.
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in interest rates or reduction in credit availability.321 The overall effect of
the CARD Act has been thus to reduce credit costs for consumers by
nearly $12 billion annually.322 This empirical work demonstrates that,
despite banks’ warnings, the CARD Act did not increase the cost of credit
or decrease its availability. Although ﬁnancial institutions stated they
would offset CARD Act losses, concerns about losing customers appear to
have limited their adjustment. Accurate insights about regulatory efficacy
rely on studying how ﬁrms actually respond to consumer-oriented
regulations.
1. Listening to Banks Can Lead to Poorly Designed Regulation. —
Overreliance on banks’ comments on how they plan to respond to regulation can lead to ineffective regulation, as the Durbin Amendment
demonstrates. Initially, policymakers proposed regulating credit, rather
than debit, interchange.323 This made sense: In the decade leading up to
the Recession, card issuers had introduced premium cards with high interchange rates. To incentivize consumers to use these cards, they offered
rewards. The result of the growth in rewards credit cards was that (1)
consumers were using credit cards more, thus increasing their indebtedness;
and (2) the inequitable cross-subsidization of the wealthy grew, because only
the wealthy had access to these payment instruments.324
In Australia, predecessor regulation that capped credit card interchange successfully addressed the problems in this market.325 Australia’s
cap on credit card interchange increased the use of debit cards, which
are generally regarded as a safer payment instrument because they decouple ﬁnancial transacting from borrowing. This means that debit
usage, unlike credit usage, does not increase indebtedness. Because
credit card interchange became less proﬁtable, card issuers had less incentive to encourage credit usage and thus lowered rewards, decreasing
the cross-subsidization of the wealthy by their low-income counterparts.
In this case, a potentially useful regulation (restriction on credit
interchange) was abandoned in favor of a harmful one (restriction on
debit interchange) precisely because regulators were too attentive to
banks’ warnings about the impact of intervention. Banks assured

321. Id. at 115, 160.
322. Id. at 145.
323. See, e.g., Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008, H.R. 5546, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (2008)
(proposing for credit interchange rates to be set by Electronic Payment System judges).
324. See Pew Research Ctr., What Americans Pay For—And How 3 (2007),
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/10/Expenses.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7CHM-XG2Q] (ﬁnding that people with higher incomes are more likely than
people with lower income to cite rewards programs as their reason for using credit cards).
325. See Credit Cards: Regulatory Framework, Reserve Bank of Austl., https://www.
rba.gov.au/payments-and-infrastructure/credit-cards/regulatory-framework.html [https://
perma.cc/8XTB-J7MS] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) (“In short, the current credit card
regulations cap credit card interchange fees to a weighted average of 0.50 per cent of
transaction value . . . .”).
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policymakers that capping credit interchange fees would increase the
cost of credit “at a time when the economy thirst[ed] for credit to sustain
an economic recovery.”326 Regulators subsequently changed tacks and
sought to cap debit rather than credit interchange out of fears that a
decrease in credit supply could prolong the Recession. Senator Durbin
was so convinced about the inevitability of consumer harm from
regulating credit card interchange that he celebrated that unlike earlier
proposals, his namesake Amendment would leave credit fees unchecked.
It is impossible to know how banks would have responded to a cap
on credit interchange fees. If the Australian case study is informative,
then there is reason to believe the impact would have been a positive
one: less cross-subsidization of the wealthy by the poor. Certainly, it is easy
to understand why banks pushed against credit card interchange
regulation: Credit interchange rates are higher and card issuers generate
signiﬁcant revenue from inducing consumers to use these cards with
rewards.327 One bank executive describes Durbin as the “lesser of two
evils” when it came to interchange regulation, stating “we would have
preferred no regulation, but if they were going to do something, better
debit than credit.”328
The ability of industry to shape regulation is precisely why economist
George Stigler was wary of the regulatory project. Stigler’s central thesis
was that regulation would inevitably be “acquired by the industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its beneﬁt.”329 The watering down of
interchange reform illustrates Stigler’s concerns. For consumer ﬁnancial
regulation to serve consumers, regulators must be skeptical of how sophisticated ﬁnancial ﬁrms describe their likely response to regulation.
Being too beholden to concerns voiced by industry can dismantle potentially useful interventions.
2. Listening to Banks Can Lead to Pessimism About the Efficacy of
Regulation. — Policymakers are not alone in mistakenly relying on banks’
warnings about the likely impact of regulatory interventions; some
academics rush to believe banks too. As a result, two prominent recent
articles—one by Professor Lauren Willis and another by Professors Bubb
and Pildes—are overly pessimistic about the efficacy of consumer ﬁnancial regulation.330 These authors start from the premise that banks are
sophisticated and consumers naive, and as a result relatively light-touch
regulatory interventions can never be effective, because sophisticated

326. Bradsher, supra note 128.
327. See Current U.S. Interchange Rates, Host Merch. Servs., https://www.
hostmerchantservices.com/current-us-interchange-rates/ [https://perma.cc/CN5X-LX6A]
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
328. Interview with Anonymous Bank Executive, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 2017).
329. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt.
Sci. 3, 3 (1971).
330. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53; Willis, supra note 55.
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banks will always pass the costs of regulation on to consumers.331 This
criticism is bolstered by the fact that banks say that they will engage in
exactly the offsetting behavior that these authors are concerned with.
However, when we study what banks do, rather than what they say, we
realize that such extreme skepticism about the consumer ﬁnancial regulatory project is unfounded.
This fact is well illustrated by the overdraft case study. As Professors
Bubb and Pildes helpfully point out, consumer markets are not static,
and so theoretically we expect ﬁrms to adjust to regulation.332 The magnitude of this adjustment, though, is an empirical question. Just because
banks say that consumers will bear the incidence of regulatory intervention does not mean that they will—who bears these costs depends on
competitive dynamics in ﬁnancial markets that banks themselves may not
appreciate ex ante and certainly have no incentive to honestly convey to
regulators if they do understand them.
The perception that banks are sophisticated and offset any “lighttouch” regulation leads Professor Willis and Professors Bubb and Pildes
to misrely on incomplete data and anecdotal evidence rather than empirically assessing the incidence of the regulations they study. Incidentally,
their inﬂuential critiques of behavioral policy approaches suffer from a
behavioral problem themselves: They are anchored to the prior theory
that light-touch regulation is ineffective and rely on conﬁrming evidence,
rather than thorough data-driven analysis.
For example, Professor Lauren Willis cites vivid anecdotal evidence
as proof of the failure of changes to the overdraft default rule:
Consumers quickly realized that there is an immediate
intangible beneﬁt to opting out [of the no overdraft default]—
the marketing will stop. The calls and emails will cease, the
tellers will stop asking, and those who bank online will be able
to navigate directly to their personal account without clicking
through a computer screen asking whether they would like to
opt out ﬁrst.333
This dire picture is perhaps true of how some banks approached
opting consumers in to overdraft following changes to the default rules.
For instance, TCF manipulated consumers into opting in to overdraft
protection with fear-inducing hypotheticals to convince consumers that
failure to opt in would leave them and their families exposed in moments
of distress. Branch employees—required to maintain an opt-in rate of

331. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1644 (mentioning “naive present-biased
consumers”); Willis, supra note 55, at 1181–89 (discussing how banks can undermine the
goals of regulators by using complex overdraft policies and fees that confuse consumers).
332. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1648.
333. Willis, supra note 55, at 1188.
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80% or more on all new accounts334—would combat resistance to opt-in
by telling customers:
We live in Minnesota too. It is cold outside. You are on the side
of the road. Your account has $50 in it. You know to get a
service call it is going to cost you $80. You have to get it ﬁxed.
So you make that call. If you are opted in, we will pay it. You get
an overdraft fee. If you don’t Opt-In, it declines you. You might
get stuck on the side of the road.335
TCF, though, is the exception, not the rule. It was so reliant on
overdraft that its former CEO, Richard Cooper, dubbed his yacht “The
Overdraft.” 336 Opt-in rates were more than three times the industry
average337 and so aggressive that the CFPB investigated the bank for
improper opt-in practices.338 Empirical evidence makes clear that overall,
though, changes to the default rule were signiﬁcantly welfare enhancing
for consumers. Service charges on deposit accounts dropped by more
than 15% immediately following this reform, and banks have not recovered these losses. This sustained decline makes sense given that, as a
result of this intervention, only 16% of bank customers are still eligible to
incur overdraft fees.339 Prior to overdraft reform, all consumers were
opted in to overdraft protection. Thus, changing this default rule decreased the share of customers even eligible to incur these fees by 84%.
Professor Willis’s read of the evidence—that the new overdraft regime is
not particularly successful in increasing consumer welfare—is wrong.
Rather than aggressively nudging people toward overdraft as a
product, many of the largest ﬁnancial institutions, concerned about the
notoriety of and potential legal liability from overdraft, moved away from
it entirely. Bank of America, in a move heralded by the New York Times as
bringing “an end to the $40 cup of coffee,” stopped charging overdraft
fees for debit purchases.340 Bank of America also introduced a “safe-

334. First Amended Complaint at 9, CFPB v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 17-cv-00166, 2017
WL 6211033 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2017).
335. Id. at 20.
336. Jonnelle Marte, A Former Bank CEO Named His Boat ‘Overdraft.’ Now that Bank
Is
in
Hot
Water
over
the
Fees,
Wash.
Post
(Jan.
22,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2017/01/20/a-former-bank-ceonamed-his-boat-overdraft-now-that-bank-is-in-hot-water-over-the-fees/ (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
337. Nathan Bomey, Agency: TCF National Bank Tricked Customers on Overdraft
Fees, USA Today (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/01/19/
consumer-ﬁnancial-protection-bureau-cfpb/96772082/ [https://perma.cc/3L2Q-XF3W].
338. See, e.g., TCF Nat’l Bank, 2017 WL 6211033, at *1 (explaining the CFPB’s
response to TCF’s and other banks’ use of automatic overdraft services).
339. See CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 29.
340. Andrew Martin, Bank of America to End Debit Overdraft Fees, N.Y. Times (Mar.
9, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/
10overdraft.html [https://perma.cc/MYW9-YZ5Y].
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checking” product to help consumers who regularly incur penalty fees.341
Furthermore, Wells Fargo no longer charges consumers overdraft fees on
small-dollar transactions and offers its customers the opportunity to
“rewind” overdraft incidents, removing fees for overdraft transactions as
long as customers quickly replenish their accounts.342 Citigroup does not
charge overdraft fees343 and JP Morgan also eliminated overdraft fees for
small-dollar purchases.344 These large banks are especially relevant, given
that together they are responsible for more than 40% of domestic
deposits.345 This means that for four out of ten bank customers, postcrisis
overdraft savings are even more signiﬁcant than regulators hoped.
Still, Professors Bubb and Pildes rely on what they call Willis’s
“damning account of the failure of this regulatory approach” as evidence
not only that the overdraft default rules failed to help consumers but
more broadly that behavioral economics “trims its sails” by advocating
for choice-preserving interventions.346 Their critique is that since large
ﬁnancial institutions are sophisticated, they have both the resources and
the incentives to push consumers toward the choice that is most
beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm (in this setting, opting consumers into overdraft).
In their view, the failure of the overdraft default rule reﬂects how,
generally, light-touch regulatory interventions are doomed to futility.
Instead, to help consumers, they suggest regulators need to embrace
paternalistic policies, such as a blanket ban on overdraft protection.
Far from a nudge gone awry, behavioral approaches to regulating
overdraft were a resounding success. And there is substantial potential
for additional behavioral interventions, such as “salience shocks” to alert
customers to these fees immediately before they incur them: For
example, in the United Kingdom, text alerts to consumers warning about
low account balances decreased overdraft incidence by nearly 25%.347
Past critiques of the efficacy of the new default rules illustrate how
academics can be misled by analysis that relies on anecdotal evidence.
The implications are signiﬁcant: These inﬂuential critics of behavioral law and economics approaches argue that behavioral policies do
341. Melanie Hicken, BofA Rolls Out Checking Account for Chronic Overdrafters,
CNN Money (Mar. 6, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/06/pf/bank-of-americaoverdraft/index.html [https://perma.cc/ST34-6UC6].
342. Robert Barba, Wells Fargo Adds Overdraft Protection with Rewind, Bankrate
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.bankrate.com/banking/checking/wells-fargo-launches-overdraftrewind/ [https://perma.cc/5WJY-AE2E].
343. Citi Protects Customers from Unnecessary Overdraft Fees, Citi (Mar. 10, 2010),
https://blog.citigroup.com/2010/03/citi-statement-on-protecting-consumers-fromunnecessary-overdraft-fees/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
344. Blake Ellis, Chase to Scrap Overdraft Fees for Purchases of $5 or Less, CNN
Money (June 22, 2012), https://money.cnn.com/2012/06/22/pf/chase-overdraft-fees/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/N7FS-HAHY].
345. Treﬁs Team & Great Speculations, Five Largest Banks, supra note 296.
346. See, e.g., Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1596, 1655–56.
347. Competition & Mkts. Auth., supra note 44.
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not deliver for consumers. As proof, they cite the failures of overdraft
reform—except that the new overdraft default rules do achieve their
ends and do enhance consumer welfare. Overdraft reform is a thorn in
the side of critics of behavioral policy approaches, not a paradigmatic example of its failings. The fact that prominent authors—whose work has
prompted responses by regulators 348 and garnered widespread media
attention349—miss this proves that even thoughtful academics can be misled by relying on their assumptions about how the market will respond to
regulation. These assumptions are not baseless: There are theoretical
reasons to think banks will work to offset regulation. And banks themselves say that they will offset the impact of regulation. But policy inferences based on what banks say—rather than what we empirically observe
that they do—leads to confusion not only about the efficacy of regulations (like the overdraft default rule) but more broadly of an entire regulatory approach (behaviorally motivated consumer financial protection).
Thankfully, in consumer ﬁnance in particular, academics have access
to a wealth of data. Bank ﬁnancial data are reported quarterly, and more
timely snapshots are available to policymakers like economists at the Federal Reserve. Regulators conduct surveys of consumers to understand a
variety of topics ranging from their decision to be unbanked350 to how
they choose between payment methods.351 Proprietary data from large ﬁnancial institutions—for example, detailed credit and checking account
transaction history352—allow for inferences about policy efficacy and the
limits of consumer rationality. Determining the efficacy of regulation is
ultimately an empirical question, and one this Article undertakes with
surprising results.
Table 2 below summarizes the lessons discussed in Part II.

348. Peter Orszag & Cass R. Sunstein, Give People Choices, Not Edicts, Bloomberg
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2013-12-05/give-peoplechoices-not-edicts (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
349. Jill Priluck, The Overselling of Behavioral Economics, Reuters: The Great Debate
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/11/20/the-overselling-ofbehavioral-economics (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
350. See, e.g., FDIC, Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, supra note
93.
351. See, e.g., Claire Greene & Joanna Stavins, The 2016 and 2017 Surveys of
Consumer Payment Choice: Summary Results 12 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., No. 18-3,
2018), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/2018/
rdr1803.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QJW-Z2KQ].
352. See, e.g., Peter Ganong & Pascal J. Noel, Consumer Spending During
Unemployment: Positive and Normative Implications 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 25417, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25417.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K6CZ-UQ7S] (using de-identiﬁed bank account data to ﬁnd that spending
drops signiﬁcantly following the expiration of unemployment insurance beneﬁts in a way
that is inconsistent with rational models).
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF LESSONS

Overall Lesson

Specific Suggestions
for Designing and
Evaluating
Regulatory Regime

Examples

Regulators Should Target
Nonsalient Prices:
Consumers suffer from
behavioral problems
(e.g., inattention and
overoptimism). Banks
exploit by charging
high hidden fees.

Direction regulation
of nonsalient prices
benefits consumers.
Salience shock is a
novel alternative.

The CARD Act and overdraft
reform increase consumer
welfare. The proposed $5
Durbin fee sparks outrage, and
the U.K. alert that consumer
accounts are low decreases
overdraft incidence.

Regulators Should
Address Inequitable
Cross-Subsidies:
Essentially all consumer
markets feature higher
prices for poorer
consumers. These
higher prices subsidize
lower costs for the
wealthy.

Consumer
protection provides
authority for
intervention.
Evaluate whether
regulation increases
fairness in consumer
markets; not whether
regulation benefits
all consumers.

UDAAP claims to change
interchange market (for
example, by limiting
antisteering provisions) as
alternative to antitrust
litigation. Capping overdraft
fees could have increased
account fees, banning rewards
cards may increase retail prices
for the wealthy. Even so, these
are desirable interventions to
increase fairness.

Regulators Should Watch
What Firms Do, Not
What They Say: Banks
are incentivized to deter
regulators by warning
interventions will distort
market. Relying on
these assertions is a
costly mistake.

Listening to banks
can lead to poorly
designed regulation.
Listening to banks
can lead to
unwarranted
pessimism.

Interchange regulation initially
targeted credit cards, shifted to
debit because banks warned of
credit supply effect. Result is
intervention that harms
consumers. Leading academics
believe—as banks warned—that
financial institutions offset
losses from overdraft default
rule, rendering it ineffective.
This is inaccurate: Consumers
benefitted from intervention.

CONCLUSION
The pain ordinary consumers suffered during the Great Recession
highlighted the ways in which ﬁnancial markets were failing them. Policymakers responded, and some of the earliest postcrisis reforms sought to
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tame consumer ﬁnancial markets. This Article offers the ﬁrst empirical
analysis of the consumer reform agenda.
This Article illustrates that progressive politicians who cheer all
regulation as welfare enhancing are misguided, as are bank executives who
warn that consumers will be harmed, not helped, by well-intentioned
interventions. The reality is more nuanced, and by drawing lessons from
postcrisis regulation in the debit, credit, and overdraft markets, this Article offers a roadmap for how to regulate effectively.
Its lessons are threefold. First, banks understand consumers’ behavioral limitations and exploit the fact that many are inattentive and misestimate the likelihood of incurring penalty fees. Speciﬁcally, ﬁnancial
institutions often charge exorbitant nonsalient prices without worrying
about losing customers. Policymakers should rein in on such pricing
practices through regulation.
Second, the consumer ﬁnance markets I study feature cross-subsidies
running from the low income to the wealthy. Low-income consumers are
more likely to bear penalty fees, because they tend to be both less
attentive and more likely to overdraft or miss a credit card payment since
they have less money in their bank accounts. High-income consumers are
also advantaged because they alone have access to the most-attractive
ﬁnancial products, like rewards cards. Because retail prices are uniform,
low- and high-income consumers pay the same prices; however, only
high-income consumers receive kickbacks in the form of generous
rewards. The existence of inequitable cross-subsidization in ﬁnancial
markets justiﬁes intervention on consumer protection grounds.
Finally, I argue that policymakers and academics should be guided
by what banks do—not what they say. Financial institutions have every
incentive to discourage regulators from curbing their behavior. As such,
every time policymakers propose a change, they warn that the result will
be higher consumer costs and less access to ﬁnancial products. Theoretically, it makes sense that banks will offset the impact of regulation: In the
contest between sophisticated, optimizing ﬁnancial institutions and
naive, non-optimizing consumers, the power seems to lie with the sophisticates. However, the empirical results in this paper illustrate that ﬁnancial institutions’ assertions about how consumers will end up bearing the
costs of regulation are often overstated. These ﬁndings are surprising
and differ signiﬁcantly from prior work. In the past, inﬂuential legal academics have argued against light-touch regulation, suggesting that more
paternalistic approaches are necessary to protect irrational consumers in
these markets. This Article corrects this misconception.
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APPENDIX: WHY DO INEQUITABLE CROSS-SUBSIDIES EXIST?
Each of the postcrisis interventions studied in this Article feature
inequitable cross-subsidization. Practically, less-sophisticated, poorer consumers pay higher prices than their more-sophisticated, wealthier counterparts. These inequities can exist when banks have signiﬁcant market
power, but they can also exist in perfectly competitive markets, and competitive dynamics dictate whether banks or sophisticated consumers bear
the incidence of regulation. This Appendix provides a simple conceptual
framework to establish the winners and losers from regulation to address
cross-subsidies in different settings. It illustrates that intervention to
decrease cross-subsidization is always desirable as it beneﬁts unsophisticated consumers, who are currently disadvantaged in financial markets.353
A.

Shrouded Prices and Perfectly Competitive Markets

Banks regularly hide certain prices from consumers.354 Card issuers
advertise low up-front pricing (for example, the introductory APR in
large letters on envelopes to potential customers) but hide add-on costs
those same customers are likely to incur (for example, higher interest
353. Some may argue that price discrimination by ﬁnancial institutions is not
inequitable cross-subsidization because it reﬂects the different costs of serving different
types of consumers. For example, low-income consumers may use branch services more,
which may result in them bearing overdraft fees to cover the cost of those services. This
explanation struggles to explain why different prices should be borne by inattentive, lowincome customers instead of their attentive counterparts. Of course, understanding how
cross-subsidization interacts with the costs of servicing it is important and merits additional
attention. See, e.g., Chris Nichols, Improving Customer Profitability Without a Profitability
System, CenterState Correspondent Div. (Mar. 13, 2019), https://csbcorrespondent.com/
blog/improving-customer-profitability-without-profitability-system [https://perma.cc/P2XRNMYJ] (“It is almost impossible for banks to earn excess proﬁts by delivering banking
products to indigent people or businesses.”).
354. These insights are related to a long line of both legal and economics literature
that considers loss-leader pricing and its equilibrium effects on consumers and ﬁrms. See,
e.g., Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-On Pricing, 120 Q.J. Econ. 585, 589 (2005) (presenting an equilibrium where high shrouded prices are not competed away because there is no
incentive for ﬁrms to compete on these costs); Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 149 (modeling markets with sophisticated ﬁrms exploiting consumers’ behavioral biases). Many papers around this time provide empirical evidence on this phenomenon. See, e.g., Stefano
DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 694,
694–96 (2006) (noting that consumers who choose monthly gym memberships typically
pay more than they would have paid on a pay-per-visit contract because they overestimate
their future gym attendance); Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, The Market for
News, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“On topics where reader beliefs diverge . . .
newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions. Yet in the aggregate,
a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective.”); Haiyan Shui
& Lawrence M. Ausubel, Consumer Time Inconsistency: Evidence from a Market Experiment in the Credit Card Market 2–3 (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (“This ex ante preference [for credit cards with lower introductory
rates] becomes puzzling after observing that respondents, ex post, keep on borrowing on
this card well after introductory periods.”).
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rates when the introductory teaser offers expire and penalty fees for late
payments). This framework sheds light on why price shrouding occurs, its
consequences, and why it persists in equilibrium.
Consider the consumer checking account. For simplicity, imagine it
has two components: a salient price ps (the monthly maintenance fee on
the account) and a nonsalient price pns, (the overdraft fee charged to a customer for an overdraft incident). Assume ps is $90, pns is $20. First, note
that the existence of price shrouding leads to excessive credit card borrowing,355 excessive use of credit or debit cards to pay for transactions,356
and, in this example, too many checking accounts. How so? Assume
there are two types of consumers, high-value consumers who derive a
beneﬁt of $110 from the consumer checking account, and low-value
consumers, who derive a beneﬁt of only $90. All consumers will need
overdraft protection, but no consumers think they will. If costs were
properly internalized by consumers, only high-value types would purchase checking accounts; however, believing the total cost is only $90,
both high- and low-value types will purchase them.
Now assume awareness of the nonsalient overdraft differs depending
on customer sophistication. There are still two types of consumers:
sophisticated, who consider both ps and pns when they make product
decisions, and unsophisticated, who neglect pns. Each values the checking
account at $100 precisely, Sneaky Bank’s total cost of providing a checking account. Sophisticated customers avoid overdraft fees and pay only
$90 for their checking accounts; unsophisticated customers know no better and pay $110, both the $90 monthly fee and a $20 overdraft fee. This
numerical example is summarized below.
TABLE 3: SNEAKY BANK EXAMPLE
Sneaky Bank
Cost

$100

Ps (fee)

$90

Pns (overdraft)

$20

Customer
Sophisticated pays
Unsophisticated pays
Proﬁt

$90
$110
$0

355. See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 249
(2006) (noting that “excessive borrowing, no less than insufficient savings, might be a
product of bounded rationality”).
356. Bar-Gill, supra note 130, at 1377 (highlighting that “teaser rates lead to excessive
pre-distress borrowing, which in turn renders the consumer more vulnerable to ﬁnancial
hardships”).
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But what is to stop a competing bank from entering and being
transparent about its pricing structure? If Transparent Bank offers a $100
price, inclusive of overdraft, and advertises that it does not engage in
sneaky price shrouding, newly educated consumers would still prefer
checking accounts at Sneaky Bank: Because they are now sophisticated,
they will get a product worth $100 for only $90, plus some inconvenience
cost to avoid overdrafting.357
The result is an equilibrium in which Sneaky Bank charges high addon overdraft fees to exploit unsophisticated customers, and sophisticated
customers take advantage of Sneaky Bank by avoiding high add-on costs
and getting below-cost checking accounts. Unsophisticated consumers
pay more, thereby subsidizing their sophisticated counterparts.
Sophistication is costly on two dimensions: Sophisticated consumers
must (1) read through complex checking account contracts to locate nonsalient terms and (2) be vigilant in avoiding fees—for example, by regularly verifying that their account balances are positive, or by carrying cash
to make sure they will never incur overdraft fees. But as long as the total
cost of understanding contract provisions, checking account balances,
and keeping cash handy is below $10, sophisticated consumers will still
prefer expending this effort to Transparent Bank’s $100 account.
What role can regulatory intervention play?358 Consider a regulator
that is aware of shrouded prices and heterogeneous customer sophistication and intervenes, perhaps by capping the overdraft fee at $0.359 Now,
banks can no longer charge pns but still need to cover their $100 costs in
equilibrium. As such, Sneaky Bank would fully offset this price regulation
through an increase in ps:

357. This example is a simplistic version of the model presented in Gabaix & Laibson,
supra note 149. The authors refer to the failure of the transparent seller to gain market
share as illustrative of the “curse of debiasing”: “Sophisticated consumers tend to be less
proﬁtable because they know how to avoid unnecessary costs. In such cases, ﬁrms do not
have an incentive to pursue debiasing, and competition will not lead consumers to behave
rationally.” Id. at 507–09.
358. Gabaix and Laibson brieﬂy consider regulatory solutions for shrouded pricing,
for example, enhanced disclosure and warning customers to pay attention to hidden costs.
Id. at 530. They are not very encouraging about the potential of regulatory price caps:
“[E]ven if good theoretical arguments exist for regulating shrouded fees, such regulations
put us on a slippery slope that may produce great unintended harm. Mark-up regulations
are often counterproductive.” Id. at 531. I heed this caution and attempt to highlight cases
where price caps are likely to be minimally distortive.
359. This is an extreme example, and illustrative only. For reasons discussed in section
II.B.2 above, I believe capping overdraft fees at $0 is undesirable because it will eliminate a
product that consumers may want despite its high cost. A more desirable cap would be to
restrict overdraft fees to the cost of offering overdraft protection.
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TABLE 4: SNEAKY BANK IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE, REGULATED MARKET
Sneaky Bank
Cost

$100

Ps (fee)

$100

Pns (overdraft)

$0

Customer
Sophisticated pays

$100

Unsophisticated pays

$100

Proﬁt

$0

In equilibrium, this regulatory intervention eliminates the crosssubsidy of the sophisticated by the unsophisticated (that is, of the wealthy
by the low-income).360 This beneﬁt alone is sufficient to justify regulatory
intervention on distributional grounds: A price cap can tilt the scales
away from sophisticated consumers who have access to the checking
account at a price below cost because of their less-sophisticated counterparts. As an added benefit, regulation also eliminates costly behavior by the
sophisticated, like spending copious time checking account balances to
avoid being overdrawn. Also, tackling price shrouding eliminates any inefﬁcient overuse of the consumer checking account product. A consumer will weigh the marginal beneﬁt of a checking account against its
true cost, not an underestimated cost that ignores nonsalient price
attributes.
Thus, even in a perfectly competitive world, the existence of price
shrouding suggests a role for regulatory intervention to eliminate inequitable cross-subsidies. Note that this Article proposes behavioral differences between the two groups of consumers in this framework: sophisti360. One question for those interested in these topics is why greater product diversity
does not exist in the checking account market. For example, in this simpliﬁed
hypothetical, it is possible to imagine a checking account without any overdraft protection
being offered at a lower fee than a checking account with overdraft protection, because
banks bear costs for offering overdraft protection. Literature in economics suggests that
imperfect competition can result in too little (but also too much) product diversity,
depending on consumer demand. See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 297, 297
(1977) (noting that in scale economies, greater efficiency can be achieved by producing
large quantities of fewer goods, but this “leaves less variety, which entails some welfare
loss”); A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 Bell J. Econ. 417, 428
(1975) (concluding that in cases of unregulated monopolies, the “selection of product
characteristics is likely to be biased away from the social optimum”). Interestingly, Bank of
America recently reduced its product diversity, eliminating its low-cost eBanking checking
accounts. See Colin Dwyer, Bank of America Ends Free Checking Option, A Bastion for
Low-Income Customers, NPR (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/01/24/580324251/bank-of-america-ends-free-checking-option-a-bastion-for-lowincome-customers [https://perma.cc/6TB8-F7Q7].
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cated and aware of nonsalient prices and unsophisticated and unaware.
An alternative is a rational framework: Some consumers have low marginal utility of income and thus are likely to use overdraft protection rather than expend energy reading contracts, hoarding cash, or searching
for cheaper checking account alternatives. That is, wealthy consumers are
likely to take advantage of an expensive overdraft add-on, and low-income
consumers are likely to avoid it. This “traditional” explanation361 also
generates a cross-subsidy that can be addressed by regulation, but it runs
in the opposite direction, from the wealthy to the low income, and so the
distributional case for intervention is less clear. However, this traditional
model appears unlikely to describe the reality of consumer ﬁnance markets, where consumers who bear penalty fees are disproportionately
poorer and less ﬁnancially sophisticated. With the behavioral cross-subsidy running from the less sophisticated to the more sophisticated,
regulatory intervention can be justiﬁed on fairness and distributional
grounds.
B.

Shrouded Prices and Imperfect Competition

Next, consider a world without perfect competition, with banks that
possess substantial market power. At least in the short run, banks in an
imperfectly competitive market are able to generate positive proﬁts, or
rents.362 So, for example, Sneaky Bank can charge $105 for its checking
account, even though it costs only $100 to provide. Without regulatory
intervention, sophisticated consumers pay $105, and unsophisticated
consumers pay a whopping $125 for their checking accounts.363

361. So termed by Ellison, supra note 354, at 586.
362. The particular nature of the nonperfectly competitive market (monopoly versus
monopolistic competition) will dictate whether ﬁrms are able to generate quasi-rents
(positive proﬁts in the short run that will be competed away over time) or long-run rents.
363. The analyses in Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra
note 19, and Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 19, are closely related to this example. In their
studies of the CARD Act, both sets of authors point to (1) the shrouded nature of many of
the fees the CARD Act sought to regulate and (2) the imperfectly competitive card-issuer
market as theoretical explanations for their ﬁnding only limited offset of CARD Act losses.
See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 152–53; BarGill & Bubb, supra note 19, at 971–72.
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TABLE 5: SNEAKY BANK IN AN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE, UNREGULATED
MARKET
Sneaky Bank
Cost

$100

Ps (fee)

$105

Pns (overdraft)

$20

Customer
Sophisticated pays

$105

Unsophisticated pays

$125

Proﬁt

$30

The difference between this imperfectly competitive case and the
baseline of perfect competition is that now the beneﬁciary of the unsophisticated consumers’ irrationality is Sneaky Bank, not the sophisticated
consumers.
Why could sophisticated consumers not demand a lower price by
threatening to educate the unsophisticated? This threat is not obviously
credible. Sophisticated consumers would have to coordinate to spread
their message; and, even if they were able to, it is likely that unsophisticated consumers would trust Sneaky Bank, the provider of their checking
accounts, over the less-familiar sophisticated.
A cap on the shrouded overdraft fee can help decrease checking
account costs for the unsophisticated consumer. Imagine the same
regulatory intervention as above: Regulators cap overdraft fees at $0. In
the perfectly competitive world, Sneaky Bank has to raise its price to
cover its marginal costs. In this imperfectly competitive world, Sneaky
Bank has positive proﬁts and may not offset the losses from the nonsalient price cap entirely, 364 because its customers decide whether to
open (and maintain) a checking account based on the salient monthly
fee. That is, Sneaky Bank faces a trade-off: Raise salient fees for everyone
and lower the quantity of checking accounts it provides, or keep salient
fees as they are and still generate positive, albeit lower, proﬁts than it
would generate in the absence of price regulation.
Note that the possibility of incomplete offset is attributable to the
fact that some consumers ignore nonsalient prices. There would be no
similar tradeoff if regulators instead targeted salient prices—as long as
there are other aspects of the pricing bundle to adjust, banks will fully
offset losses.

364. The degree of bank offset will depend on the elasticity of consumer demand.
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TABLE 6: SNEAKY BANK IN AN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE, REGULATED
MARKET
Bank
Cost

$100

Ps (fee)

$105

Pns (overdraft)

$0

Customer
Sophisticated pays

$105

Unsophisticated pays

$105

Proﬁt
C.

$5

Extension: A World Without Price Shrouding

What if no salience problem exists, and yet undesirable crosssubsidies remain? This describes the interchange market. Suppose
merchants pay a set fee of $2 in interchange expense for processing a
credit transaction. When a consumer buys a $100 pair of shoes with cash,
all of the money goes to the merchant; but when the consumer pays with
credit, the merchant only receives $98 ($100 minus $2 of interchange
expense). The merchant would like to pass on the $2 in interchange expense to the card-using consumer directly, but this is illegal.365 So instead,
the merchant charges $101 to both consumers. If all consumers paid in
cash, the merchant would set prices at cost ($100). So, unsophisticated
consumers, without access to credit cards, end up paying higher prices to
cover interchange costs associated with their wealthier counterparts’
credit instruments. That is, they subsidize the rewards these consumers
accrue.
Regulatory intervention can usefully address this cross-subsidy. For
example, by facilitating merchant price discrimination, regulators can
help ensure that the customers who beneﬁt from transacting with
rewards cards (the sophisticated) pay higher retail prices. Importantly,
this is not a Pareto improvement, where one class of consumers is made
better off without hurting any other group. In a perfectly competitive
365. This is a simpliﬁcation, although legal and contractual barriers do exist to price
discrimination—for example, state-level prohibitions on merchant surcharging and
contract terms that disallow merchants from steering consumers toward cheaper forms of
payment. Such measures were at the heart of two recent Supreme Court cases involving
card networks. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287–90 (2018) (declining to
ﬁnd that antisteering contract provisions precluding merchants from discouraging the use
of a company’s credit cards had sufficient anticompetitive effects to trigger an antitrust
violation); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017)
(holding a New York statute regulating how merchants communicate credit card
surcharge pricing implicated First Amendment concerns).
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market, Pareto improvement is not possible. Instead, sophisticated
consumers are being made worse off. They no longer pay below-cost
prices, with rewards like airline miles subsidized by high retail prices paid
by the unsophisticated. Although not welfare improving overall, regulation increases fairness in this market by forcing consumers who beneﬁt
from rewards cards to bear the costs of these ﬁnancial transactions.
TABLE 7: SNEAKY BANK IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH NO
SHROUDING
Merchant Cost

$100

Option 1: $100 retail price
Customer pays

$100

Merchant receives
Sophisticated (credit)

$100$2=$98

Unsophisticated (cash)

$100

Proﬁt

($2)

Option 2: $101 retail price
Customer pays

$101

Merchant receives
Sophisticated (credit)
Unsophisticated (cash)
Proﬁt

$101$2=$99
$101
$0

Option 3: Regulation allows price discrimination
Customer pays
Sophisticated (credit)

$102

Unsophisticated (cash)

$100

Merchant receives
Sophisticated (credit)
Unsophisticated (cash)
Proﬁt

$102$2=$100
$100
$0

